

**HURRICANE KATRINA:
THE DEVESTATION OF NEW ORLEANS
AND ITS IMPACT ON HOUSTON**

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Due to the large-scale devastation wreaked by Hurricane Katrina, the transient nature of the evacuee population, and the heavy caseload for government employees helping to place the evacuees into semi-permanent housing, it is nearly impossible to get complete and accurate information on the evacuee population. We have made every reasonable effort to get this information, and are confident that you will find this publication to be the most comprehensive source of information and analysis on the impact of Hurricane Katrina upon Houston.

O'Connor & Associates surveys every apartment complex with at least 25 units in each of the four major markets in Texas each month, and we rely in part on this apartment data in this report. O'Connor & Associates also surveyed major Houston area school districts on evacuee enrollment, both in October and November. We have made repeated efforts to obtain information from FEMA, state, and local officials on the number of evacuees in various locations with mixed success. We have also scoured newspapers and magazine articles and more websites than we can count in search of reliable information. It is worth mentioning that the City of Houston seems to have a better handle on evacuee counts than any of the other cities or government agencies we contacted.

In spite of our persistent efforts, we realize there are some numbers that we have been unable to get. Other numbers, like the evacuee count in Houston, appear to be constantly changing by a significant factor. We are aware that some numbers in this report do not match earlier numbers we may have published, some numbers in this report will differ from what you have seen elsewhere, and some numbers do not appear consistent with other sections of the report itself. In each case, what is published here represents the best information available. While we are unable to warrant the accuracy of every individual number in this report, we can vouch that we have taken due care to ensure that the data in this report represents the best estimates of others and ourselves at figures that may be impossible to ever fully know.

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Hurricane Katrina & The Evacuation of New Orleans

Overview of Hurricane Katrina

Hurricane Katrina originated in the southern Bahamas and first made landfall in the U.S. just north of Miami, Florida on August 25, 2005 as a Category 1 hurricane. It then entered the Gulf of Mexico where it strengthened, reaching Category 5 status and became the 6th strongest storm ever recorded in the Atlantic Basin. Hurricane Katrina made landfall again in the morning of August 29, 2005 as a Category 4 hurricane near Buras-Triumph, Louisiana just east of New Orleans, with sustained winds of 145 mph. The eye grazed the eastern side of New Orleans, but the worst damage from the storm was to communities in Plaquemines, St. Bernard Parish, and St. Tammany Parish. Katrina made landfall for a third time near the Louisiana/ Mississippi border and pushed its way along the entire Mississippi coast and into Alabama. The storm moved north through Tennessee and was last recorded in southeastern Canada.

Hurricane Katrina left most of New Orleans in tact, and initially everyone breathed a sigh of relief. However, most were unaware of the damage caused by storm surges. Storm surges caused by the hurricane ranged from 10 to 30 feet. It was these storm surges that caused the breach in the New Orleans levee system, subsequently flooding 80% of the city with water levels reaching as high as 25 feet in some areas. The storm itself left relatively little damage to New Orleans, but the failure of the levee system caused catastrophic flooding and forced the evacuation of the city.

The Evacuation of New Orleans

The mandatory evacuation of New Orleans was unprecedented. Just prior to the hurricane's landfall, New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin ordered a mandatory evacuation of the city, an order that was unfortunately did not reach or was not heeded by all in the city. As people crowded the interstates out of the city, massive gridlock ensued despite contraflow lanes being opened, and gas became scarce. Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco declared a state of emergency for all state agencies and President Bush declared a state of emergency in Louisiana, Alabama, and Mississippi in the days prior to the hurricane making landfall.

During the pre-hurricane exodus from New Orleans, most people traveled to Baton Rouge only to find that hotels were full, and unless they had friends or relatives, people had to continue westward to find lodging. Hotels westward along the way to Texas and other areas away from the hurricane's expected path filled up and gas stations ran out of gas.


Approximately 150,000 people were unable to evacuate before the hurricane hit. Mayor Nagin established the Louisiana Superdome as a refuge of last resort where stranded New Orleans residents could go to ride out the hurricane. The city provided transportation to who needed a ride to the Superdome. Approximately 9,000 people sought refuge in the Superdome prior to the hurricane. In the days following the hurricane, the Superdome population reached a reported 60,000 people. By August 30th, the New Orleans Convention Center became another refuge facility, but was soon overwhelmed reaching up to 20,000 people according to reports. Conditions in both facilities were sordid and without necessary basic provisions or order. There were still tens of thousands of people trapped on roofs, inside hospitals, and elsewhere in New Orleans without clean water, food, medicine, and other basic necessities.

Starting September 1st, evacuees from the Superdome were transported by buses to the Reliant Astrodome in Houston. The following day, with approximately 25,000 evacuees, the Astrodome was too full to accept additional evacuees and the Reliant Center was made available accepting another 11,000 evacuees. It was also announced that the George R. Brown Convention Center would begin housing evacuees starting September 3rd. As these shelters began to reach their capacities, Texas

Governor Rick Perry made arrangements to shelter another 25,000 evacuees each for Dallas and San Antonio as well as making arrangements across the state in smaller communities. The New Orleans Convention Center was completely evacuated by September 3rd, and the Superdome was completely evacuated three days later.

Many were left wondering why so many people remained in the homes, in harm's way when such a powerful storm was certain to make landfall in their city. According to a survey conducted by The Washington Post, Henry J Kaiser Family Foundation, and Harvard School of Public Health of 680 Houston-area evacuees in shelters, 25% said they did not hear the orders to evacuate. Of the 73% who heard the evacuation order, 61% did not evacuate primarily due to a lack a car or other transportation and/or because they thought the storm and its aftermath would not be as bad as it was. Others did not know transportation to the Superdome was available.

The map below shows where the concentrations of hurricane evacuees in Texas from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, though Katrina applicants are far more numerous.



New Orleans Recovery

New Orleans Recovery

New Orleans remains in a state of emergency more than three months after Hurricane Katrina made landfall. Currently, the city's population reaches 150,000 during the day but drops by half as day workers travel to other cities for the night. The day population is about one quarter of the city's population before the hurricane.

The recovery of the New Orleans area will largely be determined by the restoration and improvement of the levee system. The failure of the levee system and the fact that it was not designed to protect the city from hurricanes stronger than a Category 3 has greatly affected the moral of New Orleans people and businesses. Their return will be directly tied to the levee system and how the people of New Orleans view their future safety. Investigations of the design of the levees, whether it was known that they would fail prior to the hurricane, whether funding for levee improvements was cut, etc. as well as who was responsible for the slow evacuation of low-lying areas are under way are beyond the scope of this report but the results of these investigations are expected to have profound effects on the reconstruction efforts and future disaster preparations.

New Orleans Commentary: Reflection By a Former Resident

Written by Leslie Countryman, Market Analyst with O'Connor & Associates

I ended up living in New Orleans for a year-and-a-half somewhat out of the blue. At the last minute I decided to go to Tulane for graduate training in Economics. I confess my choice had little to do with New Orleans' reputation as a world-class city. I chose Tulane out of a combination of scholarship money and proximity to my then boyfriend, now husband. Prior to moving to New Orleans, I had visited the city (i.e. French Quarter) only once and that visit, as is typical, ended up being a blur of memories from Bourbon Street.

I grew up in Tulsa, OK and then moved on to Norman, OK for college. Adjusting from life in Oklahoma to life in New Orleans was quite drastic. Instead of living in a sorority house like I had done at the University of Oklahoma, I ended up renting an efficiency in a renovated old home not too far from campus; instead of driving to class everyday, I took the St. Charles streetcar; instead of jogging around campus during the weekends, I would jog around Audubon Park; instead of choosing between three different bars to go out to, I choose between about a hundred; and most importantly, instead of eating at chain food restaurants, I ate at some of the finest restaurants in the world. Along with the good, there were some downsides. In Oklahoma I wouldn't think twice about making a quick trip to Wal-Mart at 2:00 am, but in New Orleans I wouldn't set foot outside after dark by myself. I had heard, seen on the news, and knew of too many stories where people were held up at gunpoint, robbed, and/or murdered. It seemed like crime was rampant in New Orleans, and you just did your best to stay out of its way. Very quickly I learned which streets were the "good" streets and which were the "bad" streets. I ended up strictly living in a bubble known as Uptown, with ventures out to the Quarter every so often. Uptown had everything; a nice grocery store, several excellent restaurants, Audubon Park, interesting bars, unique shops, and beautiful historic homes. Many people in Uptown isolated themselves and it was almost like a city within the city. Upon graduation I immediately left New Orleans, as did everyone of my peers in the graduate program. All of my friends, like me, were from areas outside of Louisiana. We all viewed New Orleans as an interesting experience, but no one had intentions of sticking around after graduation, as the city had relatively little to offer in terms of professional positions that weren't somehow tied to the oil and gas industry. Although I didn't leave with a deep love for the city, I did take away an immense appreciation for its uniqueness and historical nature.

When Hurricane Katrina hit, I like everyone else, was glued to the television and horrified by the images. I was constantly on the lookout for pictures of Tulane, Uptown, Audubon Park, and any of my

old hangouts, however these never made it to television. In my spare time, I would search the Internet, but that rarely led to anything more than a picture of a downed tree. When Kathryn was sent to New Orleans to write this paper, I decided to go along and see for myself what had happened to where I had lived. We visited New Orleans November 30th through December 1st.

The first ominous thing you notice upon arriving into the area are all the snapped trees in Lake Pontchartrain. Driving further into the area along the outskirts of town, you then notice all the “blue” roofs, which are the damaged roofs being covered by blue tarps, the trash in the streets, and the surprising amount of traffic. I had wrongly envisioned the area was still somewhat of a ghost town. Exiting on Claiborne was when we first came upon the horrific destruction seen on the television. It was clear the homes were destroyed and unsalvageable. Spray paint indicating the date the house was searched and if there were any victims inside was on the outside of every single home in these hard-hit neighborhoods. Also clearly visible on every home was a brownish line, which indicated how high the murky water had risen. Driving through these neighborhoods was actually my first time to ever see them, as these areas were among the areas I avoided during my stay in New Orleans.



After viewing the neighborhoods located just off of I-10 and Claiborne, we then ventured to my old area, Uptown. We drove all through Uptown, we drove along St. Charles to view what had happened to the grand Garden District homes, we drove by Tulane, and we drove around Audubon Park. Although there was rubble in front of many of the homes, the structures appeared to be in tact, and it was quite clear many people were already back to living in their homes. There were runners in Audubon Park, my old grocery store was full of people, and it appeared that the majority of Uptown’s shops and restaurants were open for business. We stopped for dinner at my favorite sushi restaurant in Uptown, and it was really surprising to see so many people there. All of the tables were full, and on our way out, there was actually a waiting list for a table. It was peculiar because it seemed like things were somewhat back to normal; families were cleaning up their homes, out eating at restaurants, buying groceries, and walking around the neighborhood. The only things really noticeably different to me, aside from the rubble in the street, were that there were no streetcars running along St. Charles and there were no students walking around the area. Considering it was recently announced that Tulane will reopen in the spring, although on a slightly smaller scale, even that aspect of life will return somewhat to normal. It truly appears that the “bubble” has emerged mostly intact.

Pictures of a New Orleans shopping center and Lakeside Mall



Pictures of Esplanade Mall

The mall is open except for the Macy's which sustained more damage.



That evening we stayed at a hotel in the French Quarter. The French Quarter looked the same as it had always had. Along Bourbon there were a few bars here and there that weren't open, but by far, the majority were open. And just as was always normal, there were groups of people wandering from bar to bar down the street.....some things will never change.

The next morning we set out to view the damage in other areas of the city and came upon the 7th Ward and surrounding areas. These neighborhoods were lifeless; flooded cars were all over the streets, ruined belongings were piled high outside homes, and absolutely no commercial establishments were open for business. There were a few individuals out picking through what was left of their homes, but there was a different air than that found in Uptown. In Uptown, there were all sorts of commercial establishments open for business, contractors were everywhere repairing homes, and people were all over the place. It was quite clear that Uptown would be rebuilt and the people would be back. In the

other neighborhoods, it felt desolate. Little rebuilding had been done, and you could sense that little would be done in the future. People's homes and their entire lives there were over.

7th Ward Homes with Damage



The second day we were in New Orleans, December 1st, was the first day individuals were allowed back in the Lower 9th Ward, the area that suffered some of the most damage. People were only allowed to “look and leave.” No one could remain in the area past dark. We decided it was inappropriate to go view the area, as many people would be viewing what was left of their previous lives for the first time since the hurricane. What we did go see that day was the infamous levee and the neighborhoods surrounding Lake Pontchartrain, including Lakeview. At a glance, the levee appeared to be little more than a mound of land. I know there's more sophistication to the levee than that, but there obviously wasn't enough sophistication because when that levee was breeched it caused unimaginable destruction to the nearby neighborhoods. The reported storm surge and subsequent levee breach utterly demolished the area. Many people have equated the area to a war zone, and without ever viewing or experiencing a war zone first hand, all I can do is agree. Adding to the “war zone” feel was that all the workers in the area that were clearing debris and directing traffic wore heavy protective suits and gas masks. The smell was almost unbearable and keeping the car windows rolled up did little to fight the odor. The water line on several of these homes was up to the roofs, something not seen in any of the other neighborhoods we visited. A sign erected outside a destroyed home that read “Thanks Army Corps of A**holes” summed up residents' frustration.

Upon leaving New Orleans, the thing that struck me most was how normal life appeared to be in one area of the city, Uptown, and how completely opposite of normal it was in the other neighborhoods. In some ways, I guess this is a sad microcosm of how the city has always been.

Levees

A system of levees along Lake Pontchartrain was designed to protect New Orleans and surrounding areas from flooding when the lake level rises. Although the levees were designed to withstand the strength of a Category 3 hurricane, the levees failed following 10- to 30-foot storm surges caused by Hurricane Katrina. It was the failure of the levees that flooded 80% of New Orleans.

The Army Corps of Engineers is currently working to restore the levees to their pre-hurricane strength by the start of the 2006 hurricane season. Creating a levee system to protect against a Category 5

hurricane is proving to be an enormously expensive and complicated task. The design would require more than just higher levees. The city's drainage canals and pumps would need extensive work and wetlands and barrier islands would need to be restored in order to buffer the city from future hurricanes. Sea gates along the Gulf of Mexico are also among the proposed improvements. Cost estimates for the upgraded levee system are projected to total more than \$30 billion and could take decades to fully implement the upgrades. Federal officials have said President Bush will request \$1.5 billion to armor the levee system with concrete and stone, close three interior canals and provide state-of-the-art pumping systems so that the water would flow out of the canals into Lake Pontchartrain. Another \$1.6 billion has been allocated to the levee reconstruction project, for a total of \$3.1 billion, significantly short of the cost of Category 5 protection. Officials would not say to what strength hurricane the levee improvements would protect against.

The restoration and improvement of the New Orleans levee system is indisputably linked to the ability of the city to rebuild. Tulane University President Scott Cowen told the *New Orleans Times-Picayune* December 13th, "If we don't get that right, why would anyone want to repopulate here, knowing this could happen again?" he said. "If the levee question isn't resolved satisfactorily and very quickly, nothing else makes any difference." Not only do people need the peace of mind knowing they are protected from another hurricane, but insurers and lenders will require protection for the property they insure or invest in. Insurance rates are bound to go up, as they do after disasters such as floods, hurricanes, earthquakes, etc. Some neighborhoods may not be allowed to rebuild until the levee protection is improved because the damage was so severe and the loss of life so devastating after the recent flooding.

The pictures below show Lake Pontchartrain and some of the damage caused by the storm surges (left picture).



Contamination

The issue of environmental contamination has been a source of debate. The effects of the "toxic soup" created when New Orleans flooded vary depending on who you ask. Some environmental groups claim that sediment samples collected throughout the city show widespread chemical contamination.

Heavy metals such as lead and other contaminants must be removed from the soil before it is safe to rebuild in polluted areas of the city. The Environmental Protection Agency and the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality contend that a widespread cleanup is not needed and the risk of becoming ill as the result of contact with sediment is minimal. The two government agencies have been mum on the million-gallon oil spill affecting St. Bernard Parish neighborhoods.

Utilities & Services

According to the City of New Orleans, 70% of the city has electricity restored and 67% of the city has gas service. High-lying areas of the city were first to receive power and other utilities as these areas sustained the least damage and it was deemed safe to restore power and utilities immediately. Other areas, such as the Lower 9th Ward, have yet to regain power and utilities, as power lines and buildings sustained severe damage. The power company serving the New Orleans area, Entergy New Orleans, has said power will begin to return to the Lower 9th Ward by January 1st. However, Entergy New Orleans is having serious financial troubles and filed for bankruptcy protection on September 23rd. The company is requesting a relief package for infrastructure repair and revenue losses, similar to the one requested by the New York City power company, Consolidated Edison, after the 2001 terrorist attacks. If relief is not granted to Entergy New Orleans, the city may take over the company.

Some of those without electricity are relying on gasoline generators, which are dangerous as fuel can easily ignite causing fires, and the generators are rather expensive to operate. Those areas without power are also still experiencing frequent looting, particularly after dark as there are no street lights either. One resident remarked how odd it was to be able to see the stars within the city limits.

Services provided by the city, such as police protection and fire fighters, can only support a city half the pre-Katrina size of New Orleans. The city is currently not prepared for more than a couple hundred thousand people.

Louisiana officials estimate it will take at least another year before the millions of tons of debris can be removed, not yet including the houses that will have to be demolished. Originally, it was thought that the debris could be removed by next October, but the time period has been extended by at least two more months. Making matters worse, FEMA has told local officials that it will no longer pay for the full cost of the removal after January 15th. After that, local governments will have to pay 10% of the cost for the following two months, then they have to cover 25% after that.

Transportation

Nearly one quarter of New Orleans residents relied on public transportation prior to the hurricane. Currently, the public transportation system is not fully functional with scattered service throughout the city. Cars have become a necessity and it is primarily residents with cars that have been able to return to the city. In many areas of New Orleans, traffic lights do not work. Even in the areas that sustained little damage, four-way stop signs regulate traffic rather poorly and cause congestion.

Housing

More than three months after the hurricane, nearly 75% of the New Orleans housing stock is uninhabitable. With housing options in short supply, rents have more than doubled or even tripled in some cases. There is not enough affordable rental housing for the workers who are needed to assist in the rebuilding process. FEMA has brought in trailers and is working to bring in thousands more, but the supply shortage is still crippling the efforts to rebuild.

After the hurricane, a moratorium was imposed on evictions until October 25th. By November, 10,000 evictions are estimated, many of these cases because the tenant no longer lives in the city much less pays the rent. State and local laws allow evictions without cause for month-to-month leases or if the landlord claims the property has been destroyed. These evictions, however, are generally not kicking the residents out on the street.

Approximately 200,000 homes in the New Orleans area will have to be demolished according to recent reports from local economists. New Orleans city officials have said that of the city's 180,000 houses, 110,000 were flooded. FEMA grants a maximum of \$26,200 to property owners in zip codes within certain parishes without inspections based on satellite images of the areas known to have had the worst flooding and wind damage. The median home in New Orleans is valued at \$113,955. In many cases, homeowners did not have flood insurance in addition to their homeowners' insurance policies and are having difficulty receiving enough money to even begin to think about rebuilding their homes.

Tourism

The housing shortage has made it difficult to resurrect the city's economy, which includes the port operations, petrochemical sector, and tourism business. In 2004, more than 10 million visitors brought approximately \$6 billion into the local economy. Businesses throughout the city are hiring, but there are not enough workers to fill the positions. Without a fully functioning service sector, the city's tourism trade has been especially crippled.

If there is one thing the tourism industry has to look forward to, it's the upcoming Mardi Gras. The famous New Orleans tradition will be held in 2006 and it will likely jump-start the aching tourism industry. Approximately 30,000 hotels rooms will be ready and available by Mardi Gras.

Major Employers

Tulane University is the single largest employer in New Orleans. The university recently announced it will reopen in January for spring classes and expects 90% of upper classmen and 80% of freshmen to return. The university has offered its facilities to other New Orleans colleges and universities for use. Students from other colleges and universities also will be allowed to take classes at Tulane. Tulane has also announced that it will be laying off 230 faculty members, as well as cutting some academic and athletic programs. The university has estimated its cost from the hurricane to be \$200 million and it expects a costly drop in enrollment.

Shell has announced that it would not relocate its corporate headquarters and will return its 1,000 employees to New Orleans at the beginning of 2006. Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold, McMoRan Exploration Co. and Freeport-McMoRan Energy have returned about 200 employees to the companies' New Orleans headquarters. Tidewater, Inc. will move administrative personnel back to New Orleans after the first of the year but has not made a decision on transferring its executive team back. Entergy Corp. is considering relocating its headquarters to other locations less vulnerable to hurricanes. Energy Partners, Ltd. is delaying decisions until more is known about upgrades to the region's levee protection system and whether there will be any tax incentives for returning.

Large companies are feeling pressured to return their operations to New Orleans. Popular opinion and rumors are saying that many companies, particularly oil and oil-related services companies, will only return a small number of employees to New Orleans but maintain operations in more business-friendly cities such as Houston. There are additional costs of doing business in New Orleans and the State of Louisiana, as the governments are notoriously inefficient and costly to businesses.

Business

Throughout the city, signs soliciting jobs can be found. Many service establishments are operating with minimal staff and have shortened business hours because they do not have the manpower to remain open longer. Even Burger King has offered a \$6,000 signing bonus to employees willing to work for the company for at least one year. Many businesses are having to pay employees higher wages than they did for the same position before the hurricane in order to keep their employee from leaving for higher wages elsewhere. The costs are making it difficult for business owners to operate, even when they suffered little property damage from the hurricane or flooding.


According to information obtained from the Baton Rouge Area Chamber on New Orleans, roughly 20,000 small businesses were located in areas directly impacted by the hurricane. The City of New Orleans had approximately 115,000 small businesses before the hurricane. Research on previous disasters indicates 25% to 40% of small businesses located in areas directly impacted by a disaster would not reopen or would fail due to a lack of cash flow or the inability to adapt to a new environment.

Government Assistance

Louisiana residents and business owners in disaster-declared parishes who sustained damage as a result of the Hurricane Katrina are eligible for individual assistance loans through FEMA and the U.S. Small Business Administration. Eligibility is determined on a case-by-case basis and assistance can include the following: rental assistance, grants for home repairs, grants to replace personal property not covered under insurance policies for renters and homeowners, grants to cover serious needs and necessary expenses not covered by insurance or other sources, low interest loans, and free crisis counseling and free legal aid. The deadline to apply for this assistance is January 11th, and 1.5 million individuals have already applied. More than \$3.6 billion in disaster funds have been approved for individuals and more the \$670 billion in disaster loans have been approved for small businesses through the U.S. Small Business Administration.

Urban Land Institute Recommendations

The Urban Land Institute was retained by Mayor Nagin's Bring New Orleans Back Commission to devise a restoration plan. ULI made previous recommendations plans for New York City following the terrorist attacks and for Los Angeles following an earthquake. ULI divided the city into three zones: Zone 1, which are high-lying areas the group recommended rebuilding first; Zone 2, which are mid-ground areas ready for immediate rehabilitation and may be available for use as green space and redevelopment; and Zone 3, which are low-lying areas that need additional study but not suitable for development and could possibly be used for parks, drainage, and green space that would help prevent future flooding.



The group warned against scattered and uncoordinated rebuilding efforts that may lead to the creation of slums and lower property values. Other ULI recommendations include reforming the city's tax code, consolidating fragmented agencies for a unified, regional approach to the levee system, transportation services, emergency response, and economic redevelopment. ULI recommended the creation of a non-profit entity with the power to regulate land banking, buy homes and property, purchase and restructure mortgages, finance redevelopment projects, issue bonds, assist in neighborhood planning, and foster the creation of community development corporations. The ULI recommendations have been met with stiff resistance, particularly those who lived in low-lying areas. The fear of many residents is that the city will be rebuilt with corporations' interests in mind, not the interests of the residents, particularly the poor.

Rebuilding


The cost to rebuild New Orleans has been estimated to be upwards of \$100 billion and the effort to rebuild New Orleans has a number of daunting obstacles. Not only is housing expensive, supply shortages have driven up the cost of everything from food to construction materials. Even blue-collar workers are short in supply and are garnishing wages 30% higher than the same job did before the hurricane. The cost of doing business, living, and rebuilding has become vastly more expensive.

Baton Rouge, Texas & Beyond


National Impact

The impact of Hurricane Katrina on the national economy was exacerbated by Hurricane Rita, and the effects are essentially inseparable. The hurricanes damaged ports, transportation networks, and oil and natural gas production infrastructure and facilities. The Gulf of Mexico supplies nearly half of the nations natural gas, and with production down, the whole nation suffers from the supply shortage. Offshore oilrigs are slowly coming back on line, but some will take a year to rebuild. According to information from the University of Houston's Institute for Regional Forecasting, one-third of the nation's exports went through ports affected by the hurricanes, an estimated 8% to 11% of which are inoperable. The nation has lost 15% of its oil production, 22% of its natural gas production, and 12% of its refining capacity as a result of the hurricanes.

The map below illustrates the concentrations of hurricane evacuees across the nation based on the locations of applications to FEMA for aid. Not only is the nation dealing with the economic impact of the hurricanes, but many cities across the country are also coping with large evacuee populations. The largest concentrations are in the Gulf states.



The following map was taken from the *LA Times* on December 12, 2005. The map shows where displaced households have relocated. 59% of the households have relocated within the hurricane-damaged areas, while 28% have relocated in the Gulf states area.



Source: LA Times, retrieved 12/12/2005

Baton Rouge

A large number of evacuees went to the Baton Rouge area before Hurricane Katrina hit, which provided temporary housing to approximately 235,000 evacuees. The city was basically too full to accommodate New Orleans evacuees who left when the city flooded. The number of evacuees in Baton Rouge has since dropped below 100,000, though the actual count is difficult to determine because the population is so fluid at this point. According to the Loren Scott, an economist with the Louisiana State University, 50,000 people will be added to the Baton Rouge MSA population as a result of New Orleans residents remaining in Baton Rouge or being relocated by a job transfer, making the Baton Rouge MSA the largest in the state. Scott also estimates 26,300 jobs will be added in 2006 and another 4,300 in 2007, significantly higher than the pre-Katrina estimates of 8,800 for 2006 and 2007 combined.

Baton Rouge had difficulty handling the number of evacuees. The city and surrounding areas were overwhelmed by the need for housing – hotels had no vacancy, apartments filled up practically overnight, and there was even a buying frenzy in the single family market. According to Cook, Moore, & Associates' survey ending in July 2005, vacancy in the Baton Rouge apartment market was 8.5%. The

apartment survey ending in October 2005 showed only 7 out of 25,000 apartment units vacant, which equates to less than 0.03% vacancy.

In efforts to provide work for evacuees and assist in the recovery of New Orleans, buses transport workers in Baton Rouge to and from New Orleans. These workers are primarily blue-collar laborers, but the program has been fairly popular as the wages workers receive in New Orleans is often two to three times the wages they receive in Baton Rouge or elsewhere.

Baton Rouge could not accommodate the masses of people evacuating before the hurricane, much less those who left New Orleans after the city flooded. Many people traveling west to Baton Rouge who could not find a hotel or a friend or family member to stay with continued west into Texas.

Texas


Just after the hurricane and flooding of New Orleans, Texas provided temporary housing to approximately 380,000 evacuees, prompting Governor Perry to declare Texas in a state of emergency so that the state is eligible for federal relief funds. To date, 32,275 evacuees remain in 12,747 Texas hotels. The deadline to cut off hotel reimbursement for evacuees has been moved several times and is currently set for February 7th. State officials have said they will continue to ask for more time and flexibility in moving evacuees into apartments. Officials have also stressed that they will not put any person out on the street as a result of the FEMA deadline. According to a FEMA representative, 475,923 people are registered for Individual Assistance in Texas.

Preliminary budget figures from the State of Texas show that 48 state agencies have already incurred \$1.4 billion in storm-related costs this fiscal year alone, while the federal government has not yet reimbursed to the state approximately \$430 million of those costs.

As of November 10th, the State of Texas has spent about \$20 million a day on average for hurricane-related expenses since Hurricane Katrina hit Louisiana. Education and health care costs have made up the largest portion of the costs associated with aiding evacuees. The costs of education and health care are expected to be long-term, recurring costs. On the high end of estimates, 44,000 evacuee students may be enrolled in public schools until they graduate and 135,000 Medicaid recipients may be permanently added. The long-term costs associated with these estimates range from \$200 million to \$600 million per year. Other anticipated costs include additional funds to the Department of Public Safety, grants to displaced poor families, and unemployment job training.

Major Texas Markets

Evacuee data for cities in Texas other than Houston have been difficult to obtain and often unavailable. Houston city officials and related Houston area agencies have been well-organized and have opening provided information on the number of evacuees in Houston, the number of evacuees receiving assistance from the city, etc. While specific evacuee data for other Texas markets is not available, the O'Connor & Associates preliminary 4th quarter apartment occupancy data provides some insight on the situations in other Texas markets. The large occupancy increases demonstrated in the graph below indicate all major Texas markets have had a large number of evacuees. San Antonio and the Dallas/Fort Worth areas recorded the smallest increase in occupancy, while the changes in occupancy in Houston and Austin were greater.



Dallas/Fort Worth

According to a FEMA representative, there are currently 7,094 evacuees in Dallas/Fort Worth hotels. FEMA has awarded \$20.55 million in grants to the State of Texas in order to reimburse the City of Dallas Housing Authority for expenses related to interim housing of Hurricane Katrina evacuees. The funds reimburse the Dallas Housing Authority for costs of renting housing units, paying utilities, providing furnishings and paying moving costs for evacuees.

Austin

The head of the Austin Housing Department has said the city has placed approximately 2,000 households with 6,200 evacuees in apartments. A FEMA representative said that there are currently 1,488 evacuees in Austin area hotels. An estimated 7,300 evacuees are in Austin according to the city’s demographer, slightly fewer than the number of evacuees estimated by the housing department and FEMA numbers combined, but rather close given the high level of uncertainty in getting a head count.

San Antonio

Housing officials in San Antonio have estimated 2,000 leases have been signed. A FEMA representative said that there are currently 2,236 evacuees in San Antonio area hotels. FEMA announced the approval of a \$1.86 million Public Assistance grant to the State of Texas in order to reimburse the City of San Antonio for eligible costs associated with providing temporary sheltering operations for Hurricane Katrina evacuees.

Other Texas Markets

FEMA announced the approval of a \$1.12 million Public Assistance (PA) grant to the State of Texas in order to reimburse the City of Corpus Christi for costs associated with providing temporary sheltering for Hurricane Katrina evacuees. The grant covers costs for city staff overtime, equipment and materials, and contract expenses incurred as a result of sheltering evacuees from hurricane impacted states. A FEMA representative said there are about 2,130 evacuees in hotel rooms in Beaumont area.

Demographics

Houston

As the one of the nearest and largest metropolitan areas to New Orleans, Houston received a massive influx of New Orleans residents before and after the hurricane. Many people evacuating before Hurricane Katrina landed in Houston because hotels west of New Orleans through Baton Rouge and Beaumont were full. Tens of thousands more came after New Orleans flooded. At its peak, approximately 300,000 evacuees took refuge in Houston and according to city officials, 150,000 evacuees have remained in Houston. Houston's hotel occupancy hit a record high of 88.4% in October, up from the 65% occupancy registered in October 2004, according to PKF Consulting. The average daily room rate was \$95.34, a 12.9% increase over October 2004. Submarkets such as Clear Lake, Sugar Land, Westchase, Baytown and Astrodome area recorded the strongest occupancy gains.

Currently, 19,327 evacuees are in approximately 7,000 Houston area hotel rooms, a number that is likely to decrease as evacuees move from hotels into apartments. At its peak, 60,924 New Orleans evacuees were in Houston area hotels. The city estimates more than 100,000 evacuees have been moved into Houston area apartments from hotels and shelters. The City of Houston estimates people are moving out of hotels and into apartments at a rate of 300 to 500 per day.

Demographic Profile of New Orleans versus Houston

The following demographics are based on reports provided by Claritas for 2005, and they do not reflect any population changes as a result of the evacuation of New Orleans. We feel it is useful to look at the demographic profile of New Orleans before the hurricane versus the profile of Houston in order to see how the characteristics of Houston will change as result of the influx of 150,000 New Orleans evacuees. The New Orleans evacuees in Houston primarily consist black or African Americans and lower income households, a characteristic of the evacuees that will likely result in significant changes the Houston Metropolitan Statistical Area in terms of racial diversity and income distribution. Statistics from the City of New Orleans are used in the following comparisons, because the rest of the New Orleans MSA, for the most part, did not evacuate long term due to the flooding. The New Orleans evacuees have taken up residency throughout the Houston area, which is why the Houston MSA is used for the following comparisons. The large number of New Orleans evacuees is expected to change the Houston MSA demographic profile slightly. The purpose of this section is to highlight the differences and similarities of the populations before the evacuation of New Orleans.

Population

New Orleans experienced a decline in population over the last five years, losing 4.50% of the population. Before Hurricane Katrina, the 2005 New Orleans population was estimated at 462,861 and was projected to lose another 4.36% over the next five years. The Houston MSA has had moderate population growth, increasing 11.11% over the last five years to 5,239,517 people. Pre-Katrina growth in the Houston MSA was expected to be 10.52% over the next five years. The effects of the hurricane and the flooding of New Orleans has rendered the projected growth rates invalid, though it is noteworthy that New Orleans was experiencing negative population growth.

Race Classification	City of New Orleans*	Houston MSA*
White	27.86%	61.04%
Black or African American	66.97%	16.35%
Some Hispanic Origin	3.11%	31.96%

* Does not sum to 100% because those with Hispanic origin may also be included in the White and Black or African American classifications and other races have been omitted from this table.

The race profile of New Orleans is vastly different than that of the Houston MSA. Nearly 67% of New Orleans residents are black, nearly four times as high as the Houston MSA's black population of 16.35%. The Houston area has a large Hispanic population, with nearly one-third of the people of Hispanic origin. Of the 150,000 New Orleans evacuees in the Houston area, more than 100,000 are estimated to be black or African American.

Educational Attainment

The population of New Orleans has a slightly lower level of educational attainment, with 25.67% having a bachelor's degree or higher while 26.77% of the Houston MSA has a bachelor's degree or higher. The percentage of New Orleans residents with only a high school diploma is slightly higher than that of the Houston MSA, with 48.76% in New Orleans compared to 45.94% in the Houston MSA.

Age Distribution

The age distribution of New Orleans is slightly older than that of the Houston MSA, with 21.31% of the population above 55 years of age compared to 17.00% in the Houston MSA. The Houston MSA has a higher concentration of people under the age of 18, with 28.58% as compared to that of New Orleans with 25.93% of the population under the age of 18.

Population by Age

Age Group	City of New Orleans	Houston MSA
Under Age 18	25.93%	28.58%
Age 18-24	10.78%	9.89%
Age 35-44	27.94%	30.35%
Age 45-54	14.04%	14.16%
Age 55 and over	21.31%	17.00%
Total*	100.00%*	100.00%*
Median Age	34.44	32.76

* May not equal 100% due to decimal rounding.

Household Size

Data on the number of persons per household in New Orleans and in the Houston MSA is presented in the following table. According to Claritas estimate, the average household size in 2005 was 2.46 people in New Orleans and 2.82 people in the Houston MSA.

Number of Persons Per Household

Number of Persons	City of New Orleans	Houston MSA
With 1 Person	33.75%	23.13%
With 2 Persons	27.63%	28.65%
With 3 Persons	16.39%	17.69%
With 4 Persons	11.63%	15.96%
With 5 Persons	6.07%	8.33%
With 6 Persons	2.62%	3.58%
With 7+ Persons	1.91%	2.66%
Total	100.00%*	100.00%*
Average Household Size	2.46	2.82

* May not equal 100% due to decimal rounding.

The average household size in the New Orleans MSA is smaller than that of the Houston MSA. More than 61% of New Orleans households have one or two people. Less than 53% of the Houston MSA households have one or two people.

Owners versus Renters

The City of New Orleans had 46.68% owner-occupied housing units and 53.32% renter occupied units, according to Claritas estimates. The Houston MSA had 62.09% owner-occupied units and 37.91% renter-occupied units. There were significantly more renters (as a percentage) in New Orleans than in the Houston MSA.

Income Distribution

The City of New Orleans had an estimated 2005 *average* household income of \$50,278 with a *median* household income of \$31,849, and a *per capita* income of \$20,151. The City of New Orleans is substantially less affluent than the Houston MSA. The Houston MSA had an estimated 2005 average household income is \$70,557, with a *median* household income of \$51,104, and a *per capita* income of \$24,849. The following table delineates income per household in the subject's primary market area and the Houston MSA.

Income Distribution

Income Bracket	City of New Orleans	Houston MSA
Under \$15,000	26.77%	12.37%
\$15,000-\$24,999	14.59%	10.26%
\$25,000-\$34,999	12.61%	11.08%
\$35,000-\$49,000	14.36%	15.47%
\$50,000-\$74,999	13.72%	18.49%
\$75,000-\$99,999	7.02%	11.93%
\$100,000-\$149,999	6.20%	12.49%
\$150,000 +	4.74%	7.91%
Per Capita Income	\$20,151	\$24,849
Average Household Income	\$50,278	\$70,557
Median Household Income	\$31,849	\$51,104

As illustrated above, more than a quarter of the households in New Orleans earn less than \$15,000 annually. More than 41% of the New Orleans MSA earns less than \$25,000, compared to 22.64% of the Houston MSA. The concentration of low-income brackets is disproportionately high in New Orleans compared to other major U.S. cities. The household incomes in New Orleans are significantly lower than in the Houston MSA across most of the income brackets delineated above. Half the households earn less than \$31,849 annually in New Orleans, whereas half the households earn less than the \$51,105 in the Houston MSA. Note that these statistics compare the city of New Orleans and the Houston MSA. The New Orleans MSA is somewhat more affluent and has a greater white population than the City of New Orleans.

Crime


Crime rates in Houston have risen significantly over the last three months. As of November, the number of homicides in Houston has exceeded the rate for all of 2004, and violent crime is up 1%, according to Houston Police Chief Harold Hurtt. The chief has also noted that crime has increased in neighborhoods where a large number of evacuees have settled. Chief Hurtt has said a recent analysis of the homicides over a 90-day period showed that 50% of the homicides occurred in apartments or

apartment parking lots. The police chief has requested funding to hire more officers in order to accommodate the increase in population as well as the increase in crime. The Houston Police Department has yet to release its crime statistics from October and November, and while September data is available, one month is not enough data to illustrate a trend in crime rates.

Employment


From August to September, Houston added 7,900 more jobs than normal for this time of year, although the unemployment rate increased. The job growth does not necessarily represent the number of evacuees who have found work in Houston. The job growth includes Houston area residents who were hired or kept on payrolls in order to accommodate the large number of evacuees. We believe this number does not take into account the employees located in Houston that are working for New Orleans-based companies, such as the 1,000 Shell employees temporarily located in Houston. The unemployment rate typically decreases in the fall, but the rate increased from 5.2% in August to 6.1% in September. Normal seasonal declines in the hotel industry were reversed as staff was retained to accommodate the evacuees. The education sector posted larger than normal increases due to the additional enrollment of students and government and social services recorded increases in staff to meet the needs of evacuees. Houston’s job growth was on the rise before the influx of New Orleans evacuees, so it is likely that Houston would have posted job growth without the influx of people, making it all the more difficult to pinpoint exactly how many jobs are a direct result of the New Orleans evacuees.

According the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 33.4% of evacuees nationwide who have not returned to New Orleans are unemployed and looking for work. This number likely does not take into account the fact that many evacuees are not actively seeking work. The New Orleans economy was largely tourism-based, which has a large number of evacuees unable to find similar jobs in Houston. Houston had a large working class labor force unable to find work before Hurricane Katrina, and the influx of the working class labor force from New Orleans will make it more competitive to find this type of work in Houston.



Source: Texas Workforce Commission (TWC)


Houston School Districts



The Houston Independent School District (ISD) recorded the largest number of New Orleans evacuee students with 3,400 evacuee students enrolled in October and 5,606 evacuees enrolled in November. Alief ISD recorded the second highest number of New Orleans evacuee students with 2,620 students as of November, up from 1,400 students in October. Other districts that reported an increase in the number of evacuee students include Aldine ISD, Spring ISD, Pasadena ISD, Klein ISD, and Spring Branch ISD, many of which are more urban school districts. The increases in enrollment likely reflect evacuees from outside Houston coming to Houston for the more generous evacuee benefits offered.

Decreases in evacuee student enrollment from October to November were found in Cy-Fair ISD, Fort Bend ISD, Katy ISD, Clear Creek ISD, Humble ISD, La Porte ISD, Deer Park ISD, Lamar CISD, and Pearland ISD, all suburban school districts. We believe the decreases recorded reflect the more affluent evacuees moving back to New Orleans as they realized their homes were not as damaged as they initially thought.

Houston ISD provided O'Connor & Associates with data on specific school enrollment.



Several issues have arisen in Houston area school districts as a result of the large number of evacuee students. Many Houston area schools and sometimes entire districts were overcrowded before the addition of the evacuee students. Trailers are often used as additional classrooms because there is not enough funding to build new schools or add on to existing schools. The addition of 22,000 students has further crowded schools and stretched the budgets of school districts. Mayor Bill White and Houston area school districts are asking for legislation that will reimburse school districts for costs associated with educating evacuee students. Houston ISD said it is spending \$180,000 to \$195,000 a day to educate evacuee students, while the district has only received \$168,000 so far. It is unclear who is going to pay for the educational costs.

Houston area school districts also face a challenge in the grade placement of evacuee students. The curriculum and level of educational attainment in each grade in the Houston area does not necessarily correspond to the same grade in Louisiana schools.

The assimilation of New Orleans students into the existing Houston area student population has been difficult for many of the students. Reports of riot-like fights between Houston and New Orleans students have been reported from at least two Houston area high schools. One account from a Conroe ISD high school senior, one of the schools in which more than 30 students were involved in a campus-wide brawl, said that the New Orleans kids came into the school with tough attitudes and wanted to control the school. There is obviously another side to the story, but what this illustrates is that some territorial issues are coming into play in the schools, creating an "us versus them" environment.

Houston Apartment Market

Houston Apartment Community

The mass influx of people has had a particularly remarkable effect on the Houston apartment market. The apartment market has benefited greatly from the influx of evacuees, but it certainly came with a great deal of work and patience on the part of apartment owners, managers, government officials, and volunteers. Even without knowing for certain whether they would receive rent payments, the apartment community reached out to evacuees to move them from shelters into apartments. Many private apartment owners expedited the process of signing leases in order to provide housing for hurricane victims. Owners have made exceptions to allow evacuees to obtain short-term housing, signing short-term leases with no penalties, reducing or eliminating deposits and application fees, and relaxing proof of income verification. The Internal Revenue Service approved a waiver giving the Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs permission to temporarily suspend income restrictions and the prohibition of transient housing requirements for housing tax credit units. The suspension allows owners of tax credit properties to provide shelter to those left homeless because of Hurricane Katrina.

Houston Voucher Program

The City of Houston's voucher program was created to provide 12 months of rent with utilities in affordably priced area apartments. Despite the uncertainty of reimbursement from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for the program, the city has placed approximately 100,000 evacuees in 29,627 Houston area apartments as of mid-December. FEMA announced in November that it will stop reimbursing cities for vouchers on March 1, 2006 despite the fact that FEMA approved Houston's 12-month voucher program at the program's inception. The city announced it has stopped issuing vouchers Wednesday, December 14th due to a lack of apartment units. Approximately 8,000 vouchers have been issued but not yet used. All evacuees in Houston area hotels have vouchers but many have not yet signed leases. About 3,500 apartment units that are participating in Houston's voucher program are still available and voucher holders have until Tuesday, December 20th to sign leases using their vouchers.

In mid-November, the rules of the program were adjusted to allow households who wished to rent apartments more expensive than what was deemed affordable under the program to do so as long as the household pays the rent difference. This allowed many households to live in apartments more suitable to their needs, such as renting a larger apartment for a larger family, to live near family or friends, or to live within a more desirable school district.

After FEMA originally announced last month that it would cut off reimbursement to cities that have issued vouchers, Austin and San Antonio stopped issuing new leases for evacuees. Dallas never had a lease program. Houston did not stop writing new vouchers because city officials believed its lease program was, by far, the most efficient way of meeting FEMA's goal of moving evacuees from hotels and motels into apartments. Even as the city has issued 300 to 500 vouchers a day, the number of evacuees in hotels has remained steady because evacuees were still coming to Houston seeking 12-month vouchers. ***City officials say that half to three quarters of the households signing up for vouchers at the Disaster Recovery Center have been in Houston for less than three days.***

Apartment Market Overview

The influx of New Orleans evacuees leasing apartments in the Houston area has had a tremendous impact on occupancy and absorption levels. Class A posted the highest occupancy levels at 93.80%, followed by Class B at 92.33%. Absorption was strongest in Class B in September with 7,507 units absorbed, followed by Class A with 5,428. Demand for Class D units was relatively low compared to the other classes in September despite the large overall demand for apartment units in Houston.


Overall absorption in the Houston apartment market in September was 16,933 units and total absorption in 2005 is 29,768 units. The following table is an overview of the Houston apartment market as of November 2005.

	Class A	Class B	Class C	Class D	Overall
Number of Projects	477	1,062	955	237	2,731
Number of Units	124,247	209,605	145,329	23,831	503,012
Rent per Square Foot	\$1.073	\$0.790	\$0.668	\$0.564	\$0.817
Occupancy	93.80%	92.33%	89.51%	83.83%	91.46%
Sep. Absorption*	5,428	7,507	3,811	187	16,933
Nov. Absorption *	-60	411	756	109	1,216
Sept., Oct. & Nov. Absorption*	5,826	9,723	5,473	449	21,471
Net 2005 Absorption*	14,295	11,749	3,496	228	29,768

Absorption figures are recorded in number of apartment units.


Houston had a large supply of vacant units

From 2002 to 2004, construction levels exceeded demand for apartment units. In 2003, the city recorded -1,583 units absorbed. The large number of new units added to the market depressed occupancy levels since demand did not keep pace with construction and rent concessions became more and more common. With the rent concessions, renters in Class B and C apartments were able to upgrade to a nicer apartment, which resulted in stronger absorption levels in Class A than in the other classes during that time. Demand picked up in 2004, posting a net gain of 5,623 units for the year, though more than 16,000 new units were constructed. Construction levels, while still high in 2005, were lower than the levels seen in 2004. By the end of 2005, around 12,000 new units are expected to be delivered; absorption has overwhelmingly exceeded new construction.




Absorption

Absorption in the Houston apartment market was weak from the end of 2002 through the end of 2003, posting negative absorption overall in 2003. Demand picked up in 2004, but was fairly soft in the 4th quarter. Modest gains in early 2005 were followed by healthy absorption mid-year. Prior to September, the apartment market was on track to record moderately strong absorption for the year. The surge in demand in September brought 3rd quarter absorption to 20,162 units, be far the




strongest absorption recorded in the Houston apartment market. The demand levels were not sustained through the 4th quarter, and preliminary 4th quarter absorption data (through November) shows 4,538 units absorbed.

The absorption trends by class are illustrated in the graph below.



The Class A market recorded absorbed the greatest number of units in the 3rd quarter with 8,979 units absorbed, followed closely by the Class B market with 8,142 units absorbed. The Class C market absorbed 2,993 units in the 3rd quarter. Preliminary 4th quarter absorption shows demand for all classes weakened significantly, with Class A absorbing 398 units, Class B absorbing 2,216 units, and Class C absorbing 1,562 units. Even as evacuees moved out of Houston area hotels and into apartments at a great pace, absorption slowed considerably, indicating people are moving back to New Orleans.


2005 monthly absorption is illustrated by the following graph.



Demand was soft in the beginning of the year, but after April the apartment market posted four months of healthy absorption. The market was expected to continue at this pace when the demand for housing by New Orleans evacuees created a surge in absorption and occupancy levels in September. By the end of September, 16,933 units were absorbed, nearly 10 times the absorption rate recorded in August. Demand subsided in October and even more so in November.


The following map illustrates absorption concentrations by sector for the month of September. In September, every apartment sector in Houston recorded positive absorption. The greatest demand was recorded in the Far West sector with 2,193 units absorbed, followed by Sharpstown with 1,802

units absorbed and Champions East with 1,353 units absorbed. The sectors of strongest absorption coincide with school districts that reported the largest enrollment of evacuee students.





Generally more desirable areas posted a drop from September through November. While still reporting positive absorption, demand for units in some sectors was relatively weak. Less than 50 units were absorbed in Katy Northwest, Far Northwest, Near North, Fringe Area Northeast, Far East, Deer Park North, and Galena Park East.

Absorption levels were still strong through November, but much less so than in September. The following map illustrates net absorption from September, October, and November. The strongest absorption over the three-month period was found in nearly the same areas of Houston as in September. Far West and Sharpstown recorded the strongest demand in the Houston area. Demand in Champions East remained strong but did not accelerate like demand did in the Far West and Sharpstown sectors. Brookhollow Northwest and Near West also recorded fairly strong absorption over the three-month period. Deer Park North was the only sector to report negative absorption for the three-month period following the influx of New Orleans evacuees.





For the purpose of comparison, the following two maps illustrate overall Houston absorption from the 3rd quarter of 2004 and the 3rd quarter of 2005. O'Connor & Associates did not track monthly apartment data until 2005, so monthly data from 2004 was not available. The following maps illustrate the magnitude of the absorption the Houston apartment market experienced as a result of the influx of New Orleans evacuees.




Occupancy

The Houston apartment market experienced a painful downward trend in occupancy levels starting in the third quarter of 2002 as a result a glut of new construction entering the market. Overbuilding and sluggish job growth depressed occupancy to a low of 86.86% in the first quarter of 2005. The market posted small gains from April through August, when occupancy was at 87.55% in August, more than five points below occupancy levels recorded in the second quarter of 2002. Occupancy was expected to continue to increase modestly through the end of the year.

Much like the absorption levels recorded in September, apartment occupancy spiked, jumping more than 3 points to 90.62%. The initial rush for apartments was not sustained in October and November. While levels rose in October and November, the increases were far more muted than the spike seen in September. Overall, the apartment market picked up 0.66 points in October and another 0.18 points in November reaching 91.46% by the end of the November.



The occupancy trends by class are illustrated in the graph below.



The impact of the evacuees was felt across all classes. The Class A market recorded the largest increase, up more than four points from August to 93.88%. The Class B market recorded an increase of just over 3 points to reach 91.26% while the Class C market recorded a 2.46-point increase to reach 88.31%. Class D occupancy nudged up 0.32 points to 82.72%.

As physical occupancy levels have risen, so have economic occupancy levels. Rental concessions of up to 2 months free for Class A units and 1 month free for Class B units were the norm in the apartment market over the last couple years. As a result of the increase in physical occupancy, rent concessions have basically been eliminated in the apartment market. Renting an apartment is generally more expensive than it was prior to September, though quoted market rents have not changed appreciably.

Corporations were quick to sign leases in Class A apartments, particularly when an apartment complex had a large number of available units in the same complex. Individuals and families with financial means have also leased Class A apartments, some under the Houston voucher program which essentially pays a portion of the rent and allows the household to pay any additional rent not covered by the voucher. Most voucher holders leased units in Classes B and C apartments, as the rents in these apartments are low enough to be mostly covered by the voucher.

More Movement in the Apartment Market

With approximately 7,000 hotel rooms still occupied by New Orleans evacuees, we are likely to see many more evacuees move into apartments. FEMA recently announced it will cease payments for evacuees staying in hotels by February 7th and that all evacuees must be moved to apartments. State officials contend that the deadline is unreasonable and that they need more time to move the remaining 32,275 people in statewide hotels into apartments. FEMA has also set a March 1st deadline to cease direct rent reimbursement to local governments, causing quite an uproar in Houston since FEMA originally approved Houston's 12-month voucher program. While FEMA claims individual assistance programs are available to the voucher holders, the city is banking on the likelihood that FEMA does not wish to create a situation where it is essentially sending tens of thousands of people into the streets again.

Long Term Projections

As the smoke clears, it is becoming easier to see how the evacuation of New Orleans has affected the Houston area. Many uncertainties remain and we will continue to see changes throughout Houston. The Houston area was experiencing moderate growth before the hurricane and will likely continue on a similar trend after the initial effects of the influx of evacuees have been absorbed. High energy prices will unfortunately not create a boom in Houston's economy, and like the rest of the country, high heating bills will hurt consumer spending. The large number of unemployed and poor evacuees will likely take a toll on the city and state's welfare services. Approximately one-third of the evacuees are currently unemployed, which equates to an additional 50,000 unemployed persons in the Houston area. The state is supposed to be reimbursed for all Medicaid costs associated with the evacuees, but the additional costs of education, law enforcement, and other services require Congressional legislation for reimbursement. Texas representatives have already filed motions for this legislation, but Congress and the White House appear to be in no hurry to authorize aid for the states aiding hurricane victims. It is likely that the State of Texas and the City of Houston will ultimately pay a large price for aiding evacuees, a situation worsened by dealing with similar problems from Hurricane Rita at the same time. In the long-term, the evacuees will be a financial burden on the city and state since they are largely low-income and previously relied on government aid in New Orleans.

Houston Apartment Market

Those unfamiliar with the Houston apartment market may see the spike in absorption and occupancy as a call to build new apartments. The reality is that the absorption seen in September was not sustained and the Houston apartment market would suffer from low occupancy once again if a construction boom were to occur as it did in 2002 and 2003. A spike in new construction would likely bring concessions back into the market.

The soaring costs of construction should also cause developers to think twice before trying to capitalize on the temporary increase in demand for apartments. The cost of construction has gone up approximately 20%, while effective rental rates have increased less. The cost of natural gas is already four times higher than it was a few years ago and is still expected to climb this winter. The increase in natural gas prices will only exacerbate the high costs of construction materials and transportation, possibly making construction prohibitive on many occasions. We think these factors will help stave off apartment over-development in the Houston area. This is not to say we are advocating against new construction. Well-located deals may make more sense now than any time in recent memory, but prudence is advised.

The surge in demand for housing in September had a dramatic impact on the Houston apartment market, but the spike in demand was short-lived. We do not expect to see another surge in demand of that magnitude as a result of Hurricane Katrina and the evacuation of New Orleans. Approximately 8,000 vouchers have been issued but not yet used and all evacuees in Houston area hotels have vouchers, but many have not yet signed leases. The deadline to use the vouchers is Tuesday, December 20th, although many operators are not holding fast to the expiration date on the vouchers. We expect that the vast majority of these vouchers will be used, although city officials have said only 3,500 units participating in the voucher program are still available. Since so many people are leaving Houston for New Orleans and other areas, the number of vouchers will exceed actual apartment absorption.

Absorption levels subsided in October and November, and are expected to cool down even more to levels more natural in the Houston market once the remaining vouchers are used. Healthy monthly absorption in the Houston apartment market typically ranges from 500 to 1,000 units with higher absorption levels during the active summer months. The one exception to this prediction is with the remaining hotel evacuees who are scheduled to lose funding February 7th. If funding for hotels is cut

off and thousands of evacuees are still living in hotels, we may see another increase in demand shortly thereafter as those evacuees with monetary means or a voucher in hand hurry to lease apartments. Even then, the increase in demand for apartments would still not reach the levels seen in September.

Occupancy levels jumped more than 3 points in September as a result of the spike in demand. Similar to absorption, occupancy increase cooled down in the following months. We expect to continue seeing slight occupancy increases for the next few months followed by a slight decline as some evacuees leave and are not replaced by new voucher holders. When the 12-month vouchers expire, at approximately this time next year, we expect to see significant downward movement in the apartment market. Many households remained in Houston or came to Houston after hearing of the voucher program, which is perhaps the most generous housing assistance program available to hurricane and flood victims. Houston was not the first choice of many evacuees, but those evacuees came to Houston because the city offered the best benefits. This is also part of the reason Houston has so many more evacuees than other Texas markets. The other part of that reason is Houston's apartment and hotel markets were overbuilt enough to accommodate the large number of evacuees. Around this time next year, we expect to see softening in the Houston apartment market as many people will move away after they no longer have the incentive of free rent to remain.

In our opinion, it is unlikely that FEMA will cut off reimbursement for vouchers issued by cities on March 1st, a scenario that would force landlords to evict thousands of voucher holders for nonpayment of rent. We do not believe that FEMA wants to create a secondary evacuee disaster, and the City of Houston is fighting mightily to prevent this from happening. Should this situation occur, a sudden drop in occupancy and absorption would be recorded in April 2006. Not all voucher-holding households would be evicted; many will be able to meet their rent obligation, as they will have found employment. Many of the remaining households will likely qualify for government assistance, particularly since 10% of the New Orleans population lived in publicly subsidized housing according to Department of Housing and Urban Development 2005 data.

Since more than 53% of New Orleans residents rented rather than owned their home, it is likely the majority of the evacuees will continue to rent if they remain in Houston. Houston received a larger portion of lower income households as a result of the flooding of New Orleans and the lower class is less likely to purchase homes than the middle and upper class are. According to Tulane University sociology professor James Elliott, New Orleans had a larger concentration of poverty than any other city in the nation. He also noted that the further the evacuees travel, their lack of financial means and social resources will make it more difficult for the poor to return. The middle class is more likely to be able to afford to return. The city of New Orleans may be rebuilt with different racial and socio-economic characteristics, which is a source of great controversy in New Orleans.

Results of a survey conducted by United Way and the Downtown District (the UW/DD survey) indicate that half of the evacuee households in Houston plan to remain in Houston permanently. This percentage is higher than the 40% found in The Washington Post/Kaiser Family survey, but many of the households who did not wish to remain in Houston have already left for New Orleans or other cities by the time the second survey was conducted. We anticipate that over 70,000 people will remain in Houston. Our projection for the number of evacuees who will stay in Houston has risen considerably over the past few months. We had anticipated that many middle and upper class evacuees would return to New Orleans as soon as possible, and many already have. The continued onslaught of low-income evacuees moving to Houston to take advantage of more generous housing benefits has both increased the total number of evacuees who have resided in Houston and also resulted in a large group of evacuees who have little incentive to leave. The high percentage of residents that had been in subsidized housing in New Orleans, typically for a number of years, suggests that many of these residents will stay in Houston so long as they have free rent and other benefits.

The following table represents our projection for the Houston apartment market. Number of evacuees and percentages are based on our reasoned conclusions and necessarily rest upon a series of logical assumptions.

Evacuees by Income Strata

Income Strata	Top (>\$50,000)	Middle (\$20,000-\$50,000)	Lower (<\$20,000)
# Currently in Houston	20,000	50,000	80,000
Characteristics	Typically own homes; many have jobs to return to in New Orleans; have the means to return to New Orleans	Some own homes, some rent; some have jobs to return to in New Orleans; some have the means to return to New Orleans	Tend to be renters; many did not have jobs in New Orleans; many relied on government assistance; lack the means to return to New Orleans
Expected to Remain	15%	35%	65%
Population	3,000	17,500	52,000
Households*	1,220	7,114	21,138
% Renter	25%	50%	90%
# Renter households	305	3,557	19,024
Apartment class	Class A/B	Class B/C	Class B/C/D

*Household numbers obtained by dividing population by the average household size of 2.46 for the City of New Orleans.

The following table is a prediction of the apartment occupancy levels for year-end 2006. We made the assumption that new construction and absorption due to normal growth in the Houston apartment market will effectively balance one another out with no net effect on occupancy at the end of 2006.

Year-End 2006 Occupancy

	Class A	Class B	Class C	Class D
9/05 Inventory	123,397	209,616	145,535	23,879
8/05 Occupancy	89.61%	88.13%	85.85%	82.40%
8/05 Occupied Units	110,576	184,735	124,942	19,676
# Renter Households	75	9,548	6,541	904
New Occupied Units	110,651	194,283	131,483	20,580
New Occupancy	89.67%	92.69%	90.34%	86.19%

* # Renter households were determined on a pro rata basis.

Based on the demographic data and where believe households in the income strata will rent, we predict the following year-end 2006 occupancies.

Occupancy Summary

Occupancy	Class A	Class B	Class C	Class D	Overall
August 2005	89.61%	88.13%	85.85%	82.40%	87.55%
November 2005	93.80%	92.33%	89.51%	83.83%	91.46%
2006 Year End	89.67%	92.69%	90.34%	86.19%	90.96%

Throughout 2006, Classes B and C will remain strong, while Class A will experience some weakness. The largest proportions of evacuees who will remain in Houston are likely to be Class B and C renters. Class A renters are currently significantly fewer and those numbers will likely decrease after 2006, particularly as corporations currently leasing space will likely not lease the space for their employees indefinitely. Evacuees in Class A apartments who remain in Houston long term are also likely to purchase a home.

According to the UW/DD survey, nearly 80% of the evacuees were employed either full or part-time in New Orleans before the hurricane. If the same percentage applies to evacuees who wish to remain in Houston, approximately 48,000 people will be added to Houston's labor force. This figure appears high. Using the New Orleans MSA ratio of employment to population for 2004 of 0.487 multiplied by the 72,500 evacuees we project will remain in Houston, 35,300 people will be added to the labor force in Houston.

It is likely that households with children that plan to return to New Orleans will remain in Houston at least through the end of the school year before they return. Only one public school is currently open in New Orleans. Many Houston area school districts have excellent reputations and may be a reason some households will choose to remain in Houston permanently. According to a survey conducted by O'Connor & Associates, 15,764 students were enrolled in Houston area public school districts in October. By the end of November, 19,013 students were enrolled in Houston area school districts. Other reports in the media have estimated the additional enrollment slightly higher, around 22,000 students. An estimated 2,000 college students were enrolled in Houston area colleges and universities.

The pride and spirit of the New Orleans people makes predicting the number that will return or stay in Houston a difficult task. Results of the UW/DD survey indicate that 50 percent of the evacuee households in Houston plan to remain in Houston permanently. This percentage is higher than the 40 percent found in a previous study conducted by The Washington Post/Kaiser Family Foundation. A major owner of Class C properties in Houston estimates 60 to 70 % of New Orleans evacuees will remain in Houston based on his conversations with hundreds of evacuees. O'Connor & Associates estimates the number of evacuees planning to remain in Houston to be in the 70,000+ range. Even at the risk of elevated apartment vacancy locally, the Houston apartment community joins the nation in looking forward to a rebuilt New Orleans. The evacuees have a tremendous sense of pride in New Orleans, in their neighborhoods, and in their desire to rebuild their lives in the city they still call home. Certainly, many will stay, but even more will return home. We wish them well.

APPENDICES

New Orleans Demographics

Pop-Facts: Demographic Snapshot Report

Prepared For:
Project Code:

Order #: 963827579
Site: 01

Trade Area: PLA, (see appendix for geographies), aggregate

Description	Total PLA	%
Population		
2010 Projection	442,698	
2005 Estimate	462,861	
2000 Census	484,674	
1990 Census	496,938	
Growth 2005-2010	-4.36%	
Growth 2000-2005	-4.50%	
Growth 1990-2000	-2.47%	
2005 Est. Population by Single Race Classification		
White Alone	128,966	27.86
Black or African American Alone	309,976	66.97
American Indian and Alaska Native Alone	863	0.19
Asian Alone	11,855	2.56
Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander Alone	184	0.04
Some Other Race Alone	4,345	0.94
Two or More Races	6,672	1.44
2005 Est. Population Hispanic or Latino by Origin*		
Not Hispanic or Latino	448,486	96.89
Hispanic or Latino:	14,375	3.11
Mexican	2,561	17.82
Puerto Rican	998	6.94
Cuban	1,532	10.66
All Other Hispanic or Latino	9,284	64.58
2005 Est. Hispanic or Latino by Single Race Class.		
White Alone	6,869	47.78
Black or African American Alone	2,477	17.23
American Indian and Alaska Native Alone	135	0.94
Asian Alone	52	0.36
Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander Alone	20	0.14
Some Other Race Alone	3,429	23.85
Two or More Races	1,393	9.69



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Trade Area: PLA, (see appendix for geographies), aggregate

Description	Total PLA	%
2005 Est. Pop. Asian Alone Race by Category*	11,855	
Chinese, except Taiwanese	966	8.15
Filipino	571	4.82
Japanese	299	2.52
Asian Indian	1,372	11.57
Korean	401	3.38
Vietnamese	7,575	63.90
Cambodian	38	0.32
Hmong	0	0.00
Laotian	91	0.77
Thai	46	0.39
Other Asian	373	3.15
Two or more Asian categories	123	1.04
2005 Est. Population by Ancestry	462,861	
Pop, Arab	829	0.18
Pop, Czech	370	0.08
Pop, Danish	245	0.05
Pop, Dutch	828	0.18
Pop, English	10,242	2.21
Pop, French (except Basque)	17,162	3.71
Pop, French Canadian	2,687	0.58
Pop, German	15,392	3.33
Pop, Greek	612	0.13
Pop, Hungarian	302	0.07
Pop, Irish	13,523	2.92
Pop, Italian	11,608	2.51
Pop, Lithuanian	207	0.04
Pop, United States or American	9,431	2.04
Pop, Norwegian	802	0.17
Pop, Polish	1,763	0.38
Pop, Portuguese	204	0.04
Pop, Russian	1,351	0.29
Pop, Scottish	2,016	0.44
Pop, Scotch-Irish	2,622	0.57
Pop, Slovak	77	0.02
Pop, Sub-Saharan African	5,991	1.29
Pop, Swedish	754	0.16
Pop, Swiss	263	0.06
Pop, Ukrainian	220	0.05
Pop, Welsh	605	0.13
Pop, West Indian (exc Hisp groups)	1,388	0.30



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Trade Area: PLA, (see appendix for geographies), aggregate

Description	Total PLA	%
2005 Est. Population by Ancestry		
Pop, Other ancestries	282,106	60.95
Pop, Ancestry Unclassified	79,261	17.12
2005 Est. Pop Age 5+ by Language Spoken At Home		
	428,504	
Speak Only English at Home	392,721	91.65
Speak Asian/Pacific Islander Language at Home	8,454	1.97
Speak IndoEuropean Language at Home	9,599	2.24
Speak Spanish at Home	16,667	3.89
Speak Other Language at Home	1,063	0.25
2005 Est. Population by Sex		
	462,861	
Male	217,962	47.09
Female	244,899	52.91
Male/Female Ratio	0.89	
2005 Est. Population by Age		
	462,861	
Age 0 - 4	34,357	7.42
Age 5 - 9	32,206	6.96
Age 10 - 14	33,130	7.16
Age 15 - 17	20,307	4.39
Age 18 - 20	22,606	4.88
Age 21 - 24	27,302	5.90
Age 25 - 34	65,176	14.08
Age 35 - 44	64,161	13.86
Age 45 - 49	33,497	7.24
Age 50 - 54	31,478	6.80
Age 55 - 59	25,752	5.56
Age 60 - 64	19,075	4.12
Age 65 - 74	26,643	5.76
Age 75 - 84	19,332	4.18
Age 85 and over	7,839	1.69
Age 16 and over	356,252	76.97
Age 18 and over	342,861	74.07
Age 21 and over	320,255	69.19
Age 65 and over	53,814	11.63
2005 Est. Median Age	34.44	
2005 Est. Average Age	36.04	



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Site: 01

Trade Area: PLA, (see appendix for geographies), aggregate

Description	Total PLA	%
2005 Est. Male Population by Age	217,962	
Age 0 - 4	17,720	8.13
Age 5 - 9	16,468	7.56
Age 10 - 14	16,859	7.73
Age 15 - 17	10,309	4.73
Age 18 - 20	10,660	4.89
Age 21 - 24	13,345	6.12
Age 25 - 34	30,782	14.12
Age 35 - 44	30,418	13.96
Age 45 - 49	15,794	7.25
Age 50 - 54	14,611	6.70
Age 55 - 59	11,906	5.46
Age 60 - 64	8,570	3.93
Age 65 - 74	11,265	5.17
Age 75 - 84	7,141	3.28
Age 85 and over	2,114	0.97
2005 Est. Median Age, Male	32.67	
2005 Est. Average Age, Male	34.33	
2005 Est. Female Population by Age	244,899	
Age 0 - 4	16,637	6.79
Age 5 - 9	15,738	6.43
Age 10 - 14	16,271	6.64
Age 15 - 17	9,998	4.08
Age 18 - 20	11,946	4.88
Age 21 - 24	13,957	5.70
Age 25 - 34	34,394	14.04
Age 35 - 44	33,743	13.78
Age 45 - 49	17,703	7.23
Age 50 - 54	16,867	6.89
Age 55 - 59	13,846	5.65
Age 60 - 64	10,505	4.29
Age 65 - 74	15,378	6.28
Age 75 - 84	12,191	4.98
Age 85 and over	5,725	2.34
2005 Est. Median Age, Female	36.04	
2005 Est. Average Age, Female	37.56	



Pop-Facts: Demographic Snapshot Report

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Trade Area: PLA, (see appendix for geographies), aggregate

Description	Total PLA	%
2005 Est. Population Age 15+ by Marital Status*	363,168	
Total, Never Married	148,085	40.78
Married, Spouse present	117,833	32.45
Married, Spouse absent	25,143	6.92
Widowed	29,250	8.05
Divorced	42,857	11.80
Males, Never Married	72,607	19.99
Previously Married	28,443	7.83
Females, Never Married	75,478	20.78
Previously Married	56,822	15.65
2005 Est. Pop. Age 25+ by Educational Attainment*	292,953	
Less than 9th grade	23,535	8.03
Some High School, no diploma	50,679	17.30
High School Graduate (or GED)	68,629	23.43
Some College, no degree	64,320	21.96
Associate Degree	10,607	3.62
Bachelor's Degree	44,006	15.02
Master's Degree	17,892	6.11
Professional School Degree	9,452	3.23
Doctorate Degree	3,833	1.31
Households		
2010 Projection	173,451	
2005 Estimate	180,848	
2000 Census	188,251	
1990 Census	188,235	
Growth 2005-2010	-4.09%	
Growth 2000-2005	-3.93%	
Growth 1990-2000	0.01%	
2005 Est. Households by Household Type	180,848	
Family Households	107,839	59.63
Nonfamily Households	73,009	40.37
2005 Est. Group Quarters Population	17,917	
2005 Households by Ethnicity, Hispanic/Latino	5,442	3.01



Pop-Facts: Demographic Snapshot Report

Prepared For:
Project Code:

Order #: 963827579
Site: 01

Trade Area: PLA, (see appendix for geographies), aggregate

Description	Total PLA	%
2005 Est. Households by Household Income	180,848	
Income Less than \$15,000	48,418	26.77
Income \$15,000 - \$24,999	26,389	14.59
Income \$25,000 - \$34,999	22,802	12.61
Income \$35,000 - \$49,999	25,961	14.36
Income \$50,000 - \$74,999	24,810	13.72
Income \$75,000 - \$99,999	12,694	7.02
Income \$100,000 - \$149,999	11,217	6.20
Income \$150,000 - \$249,999	5,165	2.86
Income \$250,000 - \$499,999	2,259	1.25
Income \$500,000 and more	1,133	0.63
2005 Est. Average Household Income	\$50,278	
2005 Est. Median Household Income	\$31,849	
2005 Est. Per Capita Income	\$20,151	
2005 Est. Household Type, Presence Own Children*	180,848	
Single Male Householder	28,261	15.63
Single Female Householder	32,768	18.12
Married-Couple Family, own children	23,945	13.24
Married-Couple Family, no own children	31,594	17.47
Male Householder, own children	3,542	1.96
Male Householder, no own children	4,839	2.68
Female Householder, own children	25,145	13.90
Female Householder, no own children	18,774	10.38
Nonfamily, Male Householder	6,679	3.69
Nonfamily, Female Householder	5,301	2.93
2005 Est. Households by Household Size*	180,848	
1-person household	61,029	33.75
2-person household	49,977	27.63
3-person household	29,638	16.39
4-person household	21,036	11.63
5-person household	10,986	6.07
6-person household	4,732	2.62
7 or more person household	3,450	1.91
2005 Est. Average Household Size	2.46	



Pop-Facts: Demographic Snapshot Report

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Trade Area: PLA, (see appendix for geographies), aggregate

Description	Total PLA	%
2005 Est. Households by Presence of People*	180,848	
Households with 1 or more People Age 18 or under:		
Married-Couple Family	26,772	14.80
Other Family, Male Householder	4,506	2.49
Other Family, Female Householder	31,707	17.53
Nonfamily, Male Householder	312	0.17
Nonfamily, Female Householder	215	0.12
Households no People Age 18 or under:		
Married-Couple Family	28,767	15.91
Other Family, Male Householder	3,875	2.14
Other Family, Female Householder	12,212	6.75
Nonfamily, Male Householder	34,628	19.15
Nonfamily, Female Householder	37,854	20.93
 2005 Est. Households by Number of Vehicles*	 180,848	
No Vehicles	49,139	27.17
1 Vehicle	76,353	42.22
2 Vehicles	44,013	24.34
3 Vehicles	8,859	4.90
4 Vehicles	1,837	1.02
5 or more Vehicles	647	0.36
 2005 Est. Average Number of Vehicles*	 1.12	
 Family Households		
2010 Projection	102,726	
2005 Estimate	107,839	
2000 Census	112,977	
1990 Census	118,026	
 Growth 2005-2010	 -4.74%	
Growth 2000-2005	-4.55%	
Growth 1990-2000	-4.28%	



Pop-Facts: Demographic Snapshot Report

Prepared For:
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Order #: 963827579
Site: 01

Trade Area: PLA, (see appendix for geographies), aggregate

Description	Total PLA	%
2005 Est. Family Households by Household Income	107,839	
Income Less than \$15,000	23,017	21.34
Income \$15,000 - \$24,999	15,092	13.99
Income \$25,000 - \$34,999	13,026	12.08
Income \$35,000 - \$49,999	15,351	14.24
Income \$50,000 - \$74,999	16,941	15.71
Income \$75,000 - \$99,999	9,745	9.04
Income \$100,000 - \$149,999	8,179	7.58
Income \$150,000 - \$249,999	3,921	3.64
Income \$250,000 - \$499,999	1,691	1.57
Income \$500,000 and more	876	0.81
 2005 Est. Average Family Household Income	 \$57,923	
2005 Est. Median Family Household Income	\$37,721	
 2005 Est. Families by Poverty Status*	 107,839	
Income At or Above Poverty Level:		
Married-Couple Family, own children	23,771	22.04
Married-Couple Family, no own children	27,216	25.24
Male Householder, own children	3,022	2.80
Male Householder, no own children	3,048	2.83
Female Householder, own children	15,347	14.23
Female Householder, no own children	9,374	8.69
Income Below Poverty Level:		
Married-Couple Family, own children	2,936	2.72
Married-Couple Family, no own children	1,616	1.50
Male Householder, own children	1,728	1.60
Male Householder, no own children	583	0.54
Female Householder, own children	17,018	15.78
Female Householder, no own children	2,180	2.02
 2005 Est. Pop Age 16+ by Employment Status*	 356,252	
In Armed Forces	1,818	0.51
Civilian - Employed	184,624	51.82
Civilian - Unemployed	19,430	5.45
Not in Labor Force	150,380	42.21



Pop-Facts: Demographic Snapshot Report

Prepared For:
Project Code:

Order #: 963827579
Site: 01

Trade Area: PLA, (see appendix for geographies), aggregate

Description	Total PLA	%
2005 Est. Civ Employed Pop 16+ Class of Worker*	184,624	
For-Profit Private Workers	121,033	65.56
Non-Profit Private Workers	14,781	8.01
Local Government Workers	14,607	7.91
State Government Workers	14,724	7.98
Federal Government Workers	8,500	4.60
Self-Emp Workers	10,396	5.63
Unpaid Family Workers	583	0.32
2005 Est. Civ Employed Pop 16+ by Occupation*	184,624	
Management, Business, and Financial Operations	19,798	10.72
Professional and Related Occupations	43,911	23.78
Service	40,817	22.11
Sales and Office	47,735	25.86
Farming, Fishing, and Forestry	349	0.19
Construction, Extraction and Maintenance	12,709	6.88
Production, Transportation and Material Moving	19,305	10.46
2005 Est. Pop 16+ by Occupation Classification*	184,624	
Blue Collar	32,014	17.34
White Collar	111,425	60.35
Service and Farm	41,185	22.31
2005 Est. Workers Age 16+, Transportation To Work*	181,682	
Drove Alone	109,464	60.25
Car Pooled	29,528	16.25
Public Transportation	24,761	13.63
Walked	9,451	5.20
Motorcycle	238	0.13
Bicycle	2,069	1.14
Other Means	1,375	0.76
Worked at Home	4,796	2.64
2005 Est. Workers Age 16+ by Travel Time to Work*	176,886	
Less than 15 Minutes	40,824	23.08
15 - 29 Minutes	76,166	43.06
30 - 44 Minutes	36,221	20.48
45 - 59 Minutes	10,941	6.19
60 or more Minutes	12,734	7.20
2005 Est. Average Travel Time to Work in Minutes*	27.53	



Pop-Facts: Demographic Snapshot Report

Prepared For:
Project Code:

Order #: 963827579
Site: 01

Trade Area: PLA, (see appendix for geographies), aggregate

Description	Total PLA	%
2005 Est. Tenure of Occupied Housing Units	180,848	
Owner Occupied	84,420	46.68
Renter Occupied	96,428	53.32
2005 Occ Housing Units, Avg Length of Residence	12	
2005 Est. All Owner-Occupied Housing Values	84,420	
Value Less than \$20,000	955	1.13
Value \$20,000 - \$39,999	2,600	3.08
Value \$40,000 - \$59,999	6,576	7.79
Value \$60,000 - \$79,999	12,249	14.51
Value \$80,000 - \$99,999	14,131	16.74
Value \$100,000 - \$149,999	20,420	24.19
Value \$150,000 - \$199,999	9,361	11.09
Value \$200,000 - \$299,999	9,387	11.12
Value \$300,000 - \$399,999	3,599	4.26
Value \$400,000 - \$499,999	1,883	2.23
Value \$500,000 - \$749,999	1,863	2.21
Value \$750,000 - \$999,999	824	0.98
Value \$1,000,000 or more	572	0.68
2005 Est. Median All Owner-Occupied Housing Value	\$113,955	
2005 Est. Housing Units by Units in Structure*	206,569	
1 Unit Attached	30,792	14.91
1 Unit Detached	86,960	42.10
2 Units	27,943	13.53
3 to 19 Units	40,001	19.36
20 to 49 Units	6,229	3.02
50 or More Units	13,832	6.70
Mobile Home or Trailer	709	0.34
Boat, RV, Van, etc.	103	0.05



Pop-Facts: Demographic Snapshot Report

Prepared For:
Project Code:

Order #: 963827579
Site: 01

Trade Area: PLA, (see appendix for geographies), aggregate

<u>Description</u>	<u>Total PLA</u>	<u>%</u>
2005 Est. Housing Units by Year Structure Built	206,569	
Housing Unit Built 1999 to present	4,736	2.29
Housing Unit Built 1995 to 1998	2,601	1.26
Housing Unit Built 1990 to 1994	2,704	1.31
Housing Unit Built 1980 to 1989	16,963	8.21
Housing Unit Built 1970 to 1979	27,829	13.47
Housing Unit Built 1960 to 1969	30,932	14.97
Housing Unit Built 1950 to 1959	33,812	16.37
Housing Unit Built 1940 to 1949	27,401	13.26
Housing Unit Built 1939 or Earlier	59,591	28.85
2005 Est. Median Year Structure Built **	1955	

*In contrast to Claritas Demographic Estimates, "smoothed" data items are Census 2000 tables made consistent with current year estimated and 5 year projected base counts.

**1939 will appear when at least half of the Housing Units in this reports area were built in 1939 or earlier.



Pop-Facts: Demographic Snapshot Report

Prepared For:
Project Code:

Order #: 963827579
Site: 01

Appendix: Area Listing

Area Name:

Type: List - Place

Reporting Detail: Aggregate

Reporting Level: Place

<u>Geography Code</u>	<u>Geography Name</u>	<u>Geography Code</u>	<u>Geography Name</u>
2255000	New Orleans city		



Houston MSA Demographics

Pop-Facts: Demographic Snapshot Report

Prepared For:
Project Code:

Order #: 963749698
Site: 01

Trade Area: CBS, (see appendix for geographies), aggregate

Description	Total CBS	%
Population		
2010 Projection	5,790,478	
2005 Estimate	5,239,517	
2000 Census	4,715,407	
1990 Census	3,767,335	
Growth 2005-2010	10.52%	
Growth 2000-2005	11.11%	
Growth 1990-2000	25.17%	
2005 Est. Population by Single Race Classification		
White Alone	3,198,005	61.04
Black or African American Alone	856,578	16.35
American Indian and Alaska Native Alone	25,119	0.48
Asian Alone	281,825	5.38
Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander Alone	4,346	0.08
Some Other Race Alone	717,704	13.70
Two or More Races	155,940	2.98
2005 Est. Population Hispanic or Latino by Origin*		
Not Hispanic or Latino	3,564,716	68.04
Hispanic or Latino:	1,674,801	31.96
Mexican	1,216,310	72.62
Puerto Rican	20,762	1.24
Cuban	13,409	0.80
All Other Hispanic or Latino	424,320	25.34
2005 Est. Hispanic or Latino by Single Race Class.		
White Alone	847,568	50.61
Black or African American Alone	13,416	0.80
American Indian and Alaska Native Alone	11,986	0.72
Asian Alone	2,531	0.15
Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander Alone	1,002	0.06
Some Other Race Alone	711,419	42.48
Two or More Races	86,879	5.19



Pop-Facts: Demographic Snapshot Report

Prepared For:
Project Code:

Order #: 963749698
Site: 01

Trade Area: CBS, (see appendix for geographies), aggregate

Description	Total CBS	%
2005 Est. Pop. Asian Alone Race by Category*	281,825	
Chinese, except Taiwanese	57,821	20.52
Filipino	28,474	10.10
Japanese	5,236	1.86
Asian Indian	67,594	23.98
Korean	12,690	4.50
Vietnamese	73,108	25.94
Cambodian	3,065	1.09
Hmong	6	0.00
Laotian	1,409	0.50
Thai	2,071	0.73
Other Asian	25,246	8.96
Two or more Asian categories	5,105	1.81
 2005 Est. Population by Ancestry	 5,239,517	
Pop, Arab	23,330	0.45
Pop, Czech	41,493	0.79
Pop, Danish	7,122	0.14
Pop, Dutch	26,262	0.50
Pop, English	258,703	4.94
Pop, French (except Basque)	89,982	1.72
Pop, French Canadian	22,945	0.44
Pop, German	371,553	7.09
Pop, Greek	9,567	0.18
Pop, Hungarian	6,957	0.13
Pop, Irish	229,231	4.38
Pop, Italian	96,785	1.85
Pop, Lithuanian	2,481	0.05
Pop, United States or American	332,210	6.34
Pop, Norwegian	21,797	0.42
Pop, Polish	54,525	1.04
Pop, Portuguese	3,304	0.06
Pop, Russian	13,150	0.25
Pop, Scottish	50,002	0.95
Pop, Scotch-Irish	60,644	1.16
Pop, Slovak	2,320	0.04
Pop, Sub-Saharan African	50,745	0.97
Pop, Swedish	20,052	0.38
Pop, Swiss	5,251	0.10
Pop, Ukrainian	3,726	0.07
Pop, Welsh	10,901	0.21
Pop, West Indian (exc Hisp groups)	15,689	0.30



Pop-Facts: Demographic Snapshot Report

Prepared For:
Project Code:

Order #: 963749698
Site: 01

Trade Area: CBS, (see appendix for geographies), aggregate

Description	Total CBS	%
2005 Est. Population by Ancestry		
Pop, Other ancestries	2,471,003	47.16
Pop, Ancestry Unclassified	937,787	17.90
2005 Est. Pop Age 5+ by Language Spoken At Home		
Speak Only English at Home	3,319,927	69.00
Speak Asian/Pacific Islander Language at Home	168,661	3.51
Speak IndoEuropean Language at Home	134,596	2.80
Speak Spanish at Home	1,151,151	23.92
Speak Other Language at Home	37,418	0.78
2005 Est. Population by Sex		
Male	2,616,781	49.94
Female	2,622,736	50.06
Male/Female Ratio	1.00	
2005 Est. Population by Age		
Age 0 - 4	427,764	8.16
Age 5 - 9	409,039	7.81
Age 10 - 14	415,950	7.94
Age 15 - 17	244,770	4.67
Age 18 - 20	221,545	4.23
Age 21 - 24	296,629	5.66
Age 25 - 34	778,240	14.85
Age 35 - 44	811,958	15.50
Age 45 - 49	398,888	7.61
Age 50 - 54	344,046	6.57
Age 55 - 59	272,562	5.20
Age 60 - 64	195,197	3.73
Age 65 - 74	244,406	4.66
Age 75 - 84	135,492	2.59
Age 85 and over	43,031	0.82
Age 16 and over	3,905,110	74.53
Age 18 and over	3,741,994	71.42
Age 21 and over	3,520,449	67.19
Age 65 and over	422,929	8.07
2005 Est. Median Age	32.76	
2005 Est. Average Age	33.77	



Pop-Facts: Demographic Snapshot Report

Prepared For:
Project Code:

Order #: 963749698
Site: 01

Trade Area: CBS, (see appendix for geographies), aggregate

Description	Total CBS	%
2005 Est. Male Population by Age	2,616,781	
Age 0 - 4	217,810	8.32
Age 5 - 9	209,883	8.02
Age 10 - 14	212,789	8.13
Age 15 - 17	124,490	4.76
Age 18 - 20	115,977	4.43
Age 21 - 24	152,535	5.83
Age 25 - 34	394,389	15.07
Age 35 - 44	407,335	15.57
Age 45 - 49	199,743	7.63
Age 50 - 54	170,683	6.52
Age 55 - 59	134,437	5.14
Age 60 - 64	95,803	3.66
Age 65 - 74	113,204	4.33
Age 75 - 84	54,847	2.10
Age 85 and over	12,856	0.49
2005 Est. Median Age, Male	31.97	
2005 Est. Average Age, Male	32.98	
2005 Est. Female Population by Age	2,622,736	
Age 0 - 4	209,954	8.01
Age 5 - 9	199,156	7.59
Age 10 - 14	203,161	7.75
Age 15 - 17	120,280	4.59
Age 18 - 20	105,568	4.03
Age 21 - 24	144,094	5.49
Age 25 - 34	383,851	14.64
Age 35 - 44	404,623	15.43
Age 45 - 49	199,145	7.59
Age 50 - 54	173,363	6.61
Age 55 - 59	138,125	5.27
Age 60 - 64	99,394	3.79
Age 65 - 74	131,202	5.00
Age 75 - 84	80,645	3.07
Age 85 and over	30,175	1.15
2005 Est. Median Age, Female	33.58	
2005 Est. Average Age, Female	34.55	



Pop-Facts: Demographic Snapshot Report

Prepared For:
Project Code:

Order #: 963749698
Site: 01

Trade Area: CBS, (see appendix for geographies), aggregate

Description	Total CBS	%
2005 Est. Population Age 15+ by Marital Status*	3,986,764	
Total, Never Married	1,046,392	26.25
Married, Spouse present	2,127,618	53.37
Married, Spouse absent	247,253	6.20
Widowed	187,846	4.71
Divorced	377,655	9.47
Males, Never Married	579,576	14.54
Previously Married	238,419	5.98
Females, Never Married	466,816	11.71
Previously Married	431,116	10.81
2005 Est. Pop. Age 25+ by Educational Attainment*	3,223,820	
Less than 9th grade	338,238	10.49
Some High School, no diploma	408,254	12.66
High School Graduate (or GED)	734,734	22.79
Some College, no degree	714,857	22.17
Associate Degree	164,725	5.11
Bachelor's Degree	580,779	18.02
Master's Degree	184,812	5.73
Professional School Degree	65,096	2.02
Doctorate Degree	32,325	1.00
Households		
2010 Projection	2,019,311	
2005 Estimate	1,832,272	
2000 Census	1,656,799	
1990 Census	1,352,500	
Growth 2005-2010	10.21%	
Growth 2000-2005	10.59%	
Growth 1990-2000	22.50%	
2005 Est. Households by Household Type	1,832,272	
Family Households	1,303,274	71.13
Nonfamily Households	528,998	28.87
2005 Est. Group Quarters Population	75,789	
2005 Households by Ethnicity, Hispanic/Latino	444,933	24.28



Pop-Facts: Demographic Snapshot Report

Prepared For:
Project Code:

Order #: 963749698
Site: 01

Trade Area: CBS, (see appendix for geographies), aggregate

Description	Total CBS	%
2005 Est. Households by Household Income	1,832,272	
Income Less than \$15,000	226,593	12.37
Income \$15,000 - \$24,999	188,060	10.26
Income \$25,000 - \$34,999	203,081	11.08
Income \$35,000 - \$49,999	283,445	15.47
Income \$50,000 - \$74,999	338,843	18.49
Income \$75,000 - \$99,999	218,574	11.93
Income \$100,000 - \$149,999	228,770	12.49
Income \$150,000 - \$249,999	102,153	5.58
Income \$250,000 - \$499,999	29,107	1.59
Income \$500,000 and more	13,646	0.74
2005 Est. Average Household Income	\$70,557	
2005 Est. Median Household Income	\$51,104	
2005 Est. Per Capita Income	\$24,849	
2005 Est. Household Type, Presence Own Children*	1,832,272	
Single Male Householder	204,825	11.18
Single Female Householder	219,070	11.96
Married-Couple Family, own children	530,879	28.97
Married-Couple Family, no own children	459,307	25.07
Male Householder, own children	39,555	2.16
Male Householder, no own children	43,739	2.39
Female Householder, own children	139,079	7.59
Female Householder, no own children	90,715	4.95
Nonfamily, Male Householder	65,158	3.56
Nonfamily, Female Householder	39,945	2.18
2005 Est. Households by Household Size*	1,832,272	
1-person household	423,895	23.13
2-person household	524,959	28.65
3-person household	324,050	17.69
4-person household	292,464	15.96
5-person household	152,676	8.33
6-person household	65,511	3.58
7 or more person household	48,717	2.66
2005 Est. Average Household Size	2.82	



Pop-Facts: Demographic Snapshot Report

Prepared For:
Project Code:

Order #: 963749698
Site: 01

Trade Area: CBS, (see appendix for geographies), aggregate

Description	Total CBS	%
2005 Est. Households by Presence of People*	1,832,272	
Households with 1 or more People Age 18 or under:		
Married-Couple Family	560,951	30.62
Other Family, Male Householder	48,896	2.67
Other Family, Female Householder	165,158	9.01
Nonfamily, Male Householder	5,343	0.29
Nonfamily, Female Householder	1,584	0.09
Households no People Age 18 or under:		
Married-Couple Family	429,235	23.43
Other Family, Male Householder	34,398	1.88
Other Family, Female Householder	64,636	3.53
Nonfamily, Male Householder	264,640	14.44
Nonfamily, Female Householder	257,431	14.05
 2005 Est. Households by Number of Vehicles*	 1,832,272	
No Vehicles	135,253	7.38
1 Vehicle	654,609	35.73
2 Vehicles	763,707	41.68
3 Vehicles	213,066	11.63
4 Vehicles	50,877	2.78
5 or more Vehicles	14,760	0.81
 2005 Est. Average Number of Vehicles*	 1.70	
 Family Households		
2010 Projection	1,430,314	
2005 Estimate	1,303,274	
2000 Census	1,182,385	
1990 Census	953,839	
 Growth 2005-2010	 9.75%	
Growth 2000-2005	10.22%	
Growth 1990-2000	23.96%	



Pop-Facts: Demographic Snapshot Report

Prepared For:
Project Code:

Order #: 963749698
Site: 01

Trade Area: CBS, (see appendix for geographies), aggregate

Description	Total CBS	%
2005 Est. Family Households by Household Income	1,303,274	
Income Less than \$15,000	114,121	8.76
Income \$15,000 - \$24,999	113,376	8.70
Income \$25,000 - \$34,999	125,924	9.66
Income \$35,000 - \$49,999	181,096	13.90
Income \$50,000 - \$74,999	255,482	19.60
Income \$75,000 - \$99,999	185,560	14.24
Income \$100,000 - \$149,999	198,877	15.26
Income \$150,000 - \$249,999	91,810	7.04
Income \$250,000 - \$499,999	25,387	1.95
Income \$500,000 and more	11,641	0.89
2005 Est. Average Family Household Income	\$79,944	
2005 Est. Median Family Household Income	\$61,461	
2005 Est. Families by Poverty Status*	1,303,274	
Income At or Above Poverty Level:		
Married-Couple Family, own children	517,141	39.68
Married-Couple Family, no own children	408,822	31.37
Male Householder, own children	39,654	3.04
Male Householder, no own children	30,078	2.31
Female Householder, own children	114,610	8.79
Female Householder, no own children	55,627	4.27
Income Below Poverty Level:		
Married-Couple Family, own children	47,929	3.68
Married-Couple Family, no own children	16,294	1.25
Male Householder, own children	10,174	0.78
Male Householder, no own children	3,388	0.26
Female Householder, own children	52,142	4.00
Female Householder, no own children	7,415	0.57
2005 Est. Pop Age 16+ by Employment Status*	3,905,110	
In Armed Forces	3,007	0.08
Civilian - Employed	2,417,147	61.90
Civilian - Unemployed	154,350	3.95
Not in Labor Force	1,330,606	34.07



Pop-Facts: Demographic Snapshot Report

Prepared For:
Project Code:

Order #: 963749698
Site: 01

Trade Area: CBS, (see appendix for geographies), aggregate

Description	Total CBS	%
2005 Est. Civ Employed Pop 16+ Class of Worker*	2,417,147	
For-Profit Private Workers	1,839,205	76.09
Non-Profit Private Workers	126,331	5.23
Local Government Workers	149,836	6.20
State Government Workers	101,857	4.21
Federal Government Workers	43,322	1.79
Self-Emp Workers	149,806	6.20
Unpaid Family Workers	6,790	0.28
2005 Est. Civ Employed Pop 16+ by Occupation*	2,417,147	
Management, Business, and Financial Operations	360,731	14.92
Professional and Related Occupations	505,846	20.93
Service	322,138	13.33
Sales and Office	662,572	27.41
Farming, Fishing, and Forestry	5,393	0.22
Construction, Extraction and Maintenance	262,887	10.88
Production, Transportation and Material Moving	297,580	12.31
2005 Est. Pop 16+ by Occupation Classification*	2,417,147	
Blue Collar	560,467	23.19
White Collar	1,526,181	63.14
Service and Farm	330,499	13.67
2005 Est. Workers Age 16+, Transportation To Work*	2,372,197	
Drove Alone	1,838,354	77.50
Car Pooled	332,317	14.01
Public Transportation	74,100	3.12
Walked	36,348	1.53
Motorcycle	3,023	0.13
Bicycle	6,536	0.28
Other Means	21,271	0.90
Worked at Home	60,248	2.54
2005 Est. Workers Age 16+ by Travel Time to Work*	2,311,949	
Less than 15 Minutes	475,565	20.57
15 - 29 Minutes	770,171	33.31
30 - 44 Minutes	582,717	25.20
45 - 59 Minutes	262,492	11.35
60 or more Minutes	221,004	9.56
2005 Est. Average Travel Time to Work in Minutes*	31.55	



Pop-Facts: Demographic Snapshot Report

Prepared For:
Project Code:

Order #: 963749698
Site: 01

Trade Area: CBS, (see appendix for geographies), aggregate

Description	Total CBS	%
2005 Est. Tenure of Occupied Housing Units	1,832,272	
Owner Occupied	1,137,599	62.09
Renter Occupied	694,673	37.91
2005 Occ Housing Units, Avg Length of Residence	9	
2005 Est. All Owner-Occupied Housing Values	1,137,599	
Value Less than \$20,000	34,362	3.02
Value \$20,000 - \$39,999	71,887	6.32
Value \$40,000 - \$59,999	110,998	9.76
Value \$60,000 - \$79,999	143,196	12.59
Value \$80,000 - \$99,999	163,379	14.36
Value \$100,000 - \$149,999	263,314	23.15
Value \$150,000 - \$199,999	141,448	12.43
Value \$200,000 - \$299,999	117,110	10.29
Value \$300,000 - \$399,999	40,858	3.59
Value \$400,000 - \$499,999	20,336	1.79
Value \$500,000 - \$749,999	16,534	1.45
Value \$750,000 - \$999,999	7,378	0.65
Value \$1,000,000 or more	6,799	0.60
2005 Est. Median All Owner-Occupied Housing Value	\$108,541	
2005 Est. Housing Units by Units in Structure*	1,989,321	
1 Unit Attached	68,992	3.47
1 Unit Detached	1,204,293	60.54
2 Units	25,703	1.29
3 to 19 Units	250,027	12.57
20 to 49 Units	61,897	3.11
50 or More Units	249,331	12.53
Mobile Home or Trailer	125,202	6.29
Boat, RV, Van, etc.	3,876	0.19



Pop-Facts: Demographic Snapshot Report

Prepared For:
Project Code:

Order #: 963749698
Site: 01

Trade Area: CBS, (see appendix for geographies), aggregate

<u>Description</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>%</u>
	<u>CBS</u>	
2005 Est. Housing Units by Year Structure Built	1,989,321	
Housing Unit Built 1999 to present	297,872	14.97
Housing Unit Built 1995 to 1998	155,521	7.82
Housing Unit Built 1990 to 1994	130,631	6.57
Housing Unit Built 1980 to 1989	406,171	20.42
Housing Unit Built 1970 to 1979	458,253	23.04
Housing Unit Built 1960 to 1969	238,552	11.99
Housing Unit Built 1950 to 1959	163,951	8.24
Housing Unit Built 1940 to 1949	75,673	3.80
Housing Unit Built 1939 or Earlier	62,697	3.15
2005 Est. Median Year Structure Built **	1980	

*In contrast to Claritas Demographic Estimates, "smoothed" data items are Census 2000 tables made consistent with current year estimated and 5 year projected base counts.

**1939 will appear when at least half of the Housing Units in this reports area were built in 1939 or earlier.



Pop-Facts: Demographic Snapshot Report

Prepared For:
Project Code:

Order #: 963749698
Site: 01

Appendix: Area Listing

Area Name:

Type: List - Core Based Statistical Areas Reporting Detail: Aggregate Reporting Level: Core Based Statistical Areas

<u>Geography Code</u>	<u>Geography Name</u>	<u>Geography Code</u>	<u>Geography Name</u>
26420	Houston-Baytown-Sugar Land, TX		



Data

Houston Area School District Evacuee Student Enrollment

School District	Contact Info	Oct-05	Nov-05
Houston ISD	713-892-6558	3,400	5,606
Fort Bend ISD	281-634-1000	1,662	1,547
Cy-Fair ISD	281-807-8939	1,500	1,141
Alief ISD	281-498-8110	1,400	2,620
Katy ISD	281-396-2308	1,200	1,100
Spring ISD	281-586-1100	943	1,230
Clear Creek ISD	281-284-0000	865	594
Aldine ISD	281-985-6202	853	1,428
Pasadena ISD	713-740-0000	800	875
Klein ISD	832-249-4000	680	700
Humble ISD	281-641-1000	566	345
Spring Branch ISD	713-464-1511	526	989
Pearland ISD	281-485-3203	428	221
Galena Park ISD	832-386-1094	347	255
Lamar CISD	281-341-3100	260	159
La Porte ISD	281-604-7001	200	96
Deer Park ISD	832-668-7000	134	107
Total		15,764	19,013

Quarterly Absorption

Sector	3 rd Quarter 2004	3 rd Quarter 2005
Almeda - SW	351	116
Baytown	151	261
Bear Creek-NW	343	666
Bellaire-Sw	24	1,536
Brazosport	-74	160
Brookhollow -NW	-217	729
Central Business District	38	326
Champions-E	117	1,628
Champions-W	309	639
Deer Park-N	9	4
Far East	-3	9
Far Northeast-Airport	-17	625
Far Northeast-Lake Houston	67	417
Far Northwest	5	9
Far West	464	2,712
Fort Bend	146	774
Friendswood/Pearland	229	735
Fringe Area-E	23	121
Fringe Area-N	-7	87
Fringe Area-NE	24	20
Fringe Area-NW	126	283
Galena Park-E	0	9
Galveston/Texas City	86	501
Greenway/Montrose	122	499
Gulf Freeway-SE	-298	847
I 45 North	85	697
Inwood-NW	31	304
Katy-NW	-52	67
NASA-E	-80	326
NASA-W	-16	70
Near East	-14	197
Near North	37	38
Near Northeast	-8	179
Near West	103	1,025
Pasadena-S	259	519
Sharpstown	24	1,330
South	-11	240
Spring Branch-NW	-26	82
Tomball-NW	91	44
West Loop	144	737
Woodlands/Conroe	305	600
Overall	2,977	20,222

Monthly Absorption

Sector	Aug-05	Sep-05	Oct-05	Nov-05	Sep-Nov-05
Almeda - SW	54	220	13	8	241
Baytown	44	307	134	32	473
Bear Creek-NW	105	520	28	-25	523
Bellaire-Sw	253	1,037	63	57	1,157
Brazosport	12	139	-56	-14	69
Brookhollow -NW	-178	883	63	255	1,201
Central Business District	40	222	19	-50	191
Champions-E	276	1,353	214	218	1,785
Champions-W	44	554	24	-14	564
Deer Park-N	3	1	-11	0	-10
Far East	-1	33	15	0	48
Far Northeast-Airport	-52	650	96	73	819
Far Northeast-Lake Houston	27	328	75	48	451
Far Northwest	12	5	5	2	12
Far West	328	2,193	349	-89	2,453
Fort Bend	299	376	79	-11	444
Friendswood/Pearland	222	473	55	-98	430
Fringe Area-E	9	113	41	15	169
Fringe Area-N	-2	95	-3	0	92
Fringe Area-NE	7	13	-2	0	11
Fringe Area-NW	-5	159	55	241	455
Galena Park-E	1	8	0	-7	1
Galveston/Texas City	117	465	-7	6	464
Greenway/Montrose	131	154	-11	-35	108
Gulf Freeway-SE	281	643	392	33	1,068
I 45 North	91	498	-35	-60	403
Inwood-NW	28	286	62	35	383
Katy-NW	-6	30	7	5	42
NASA-E	37	144	163	-19	288
NASA-W	20	53	61	4	118
Near East	-24	267	81	64	412
Near North	28	10	-15	38	33
Near Northeast	13	134	46	-25	155
Near West	11	1,000	230	227	1,457
Pasadena-S	-108	487	-169	22	340
Sharpstown	-400	1,802	937	342	3,081
South	93	131	95	23	249
Spring Branch-NW	-21	87	81	69	237
Tomball-NW	-23	59	-20	-6	33
West Loop	6	584	9	7	600
Woodlands/Conroe	216	416	165	-152	429
Total	1,789	16,993	3,322	1,216	21,531

Maps